Semiconductor design companies are integrating proprietary intellectual property (IP) blocks to build custom integrated circuits (ICs) and fabricate them in a third-party foundry. Unauthorized IC copies cost these companies billions of dollars annually. While several methods have been proposed for hardware IP obfuscation, they operate on the gate-level netlist, i.e., after the synthesis tools embed most of the semantic information into the netlist. We propose ASSURE to protect hardware IP modules operating on the register-transfer level (RTL) description. The RTL approach has three advantages: 1) it allows designers to obfuscate IP cores generated with many different methods (e.g., hardware generators, high-level synthesis tools, and preexisting IPs); 2) it obfuscates the semantics of an IC before logic synthesis; and 3) it does not require modifications to EDA flows. We perform a cost and security assessment of ASSURE against state-of-the-art oracle-less attacks.

ASSURE: RTL Locking Against an Untrusted Foundry

Pilato, Christian;Sciuto, Donatella;
2021-01-01

Abstract

Semiconductor design companies are integrating proprietary intellectual property (IP) blocks to build custom integrated circuits (ICs) and fabricate them in a third-party foundry. Unauthorized IC copies cost these companies billions of dollars annually. While several methods have been proposed for hardware IP obfuscation, they operate on the gate-level netlist, i.e., after the synthesis tools embed most of the semantic information into the netlist. We propose ASSURE to protect hardware IP modules operating on the register-transfer level (RTL) description. The RTL approach has three advantages: 1) it allows designers to obfuscate IP cores generated with many different methods (e.g., hardware generators, high-level synthesis tools, and preexisting IPs); 2) it obfuscates the semantics of an IC before logic synthesis; and 3) it does not require modifications to EDA flows. We perform a cost and security assessment of ASSURE against state-of-the-art oracle-less attacks.
2021
IP protection , logic locking , register-transfer level (RTL) , untrusted foundry
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1172512
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