This work presents a differential fault attack against AES employin any key size, regardless of the key scheduling strategy. The presented attack relies on the injection of a single bit flip, and is able to check for the correctness of the injection of the fault a posteriori. This fault model nicely fits the one obtained through underfeeding a computing device employing a low cost tunable power supply unit. This fault injection technique, which has been successfully applied to hardware implementations of AES, receives a further validation in this paper where the target computing device is a system-on-chip based on the widely adopted ARM926EJ-S CPU core. The attack is successfully carried out against two different devices, etched in two different technologies (a generic 130nm and a low-power oriented 90nm library) running a software implementation of AES-192 and AES-256 and has been reproduced on multiple instances of the same chip.

Fault attack on AES with single-bit induced faults

BARENGHI, ALESSANDRO;BREVEGLIERI, LUCA ODDONE;PELOSI, GERARDO
2010

Abstract

This work presents a differential fault attack against AES employin any key size, regardless of the key scheduling strategy. The presented attack relies on the injection of a single bit flip, and is able to check for the correctness of the injection of the fault a posteriori. This fault model nicely fits the one obtained through underfeeding a computing device employing a low cost tunable power supply unit. This fault injection technique, which has been successfully applied to hardware implementations of AES, receives a further validation in this paper where the target computing device is a system-on-chip based on the widely adopted ARM926EJ-S CPU core. The attack is successfully carried out against two different devices, etched in two different technologies (a generic 130nm and a low-power oriented 90nm library) running a software implementation of AES-192 and AES-256 and has been reproduced on multiple instances of the same chip.
Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Information Assurance and Security 2010 - IAS 2010
9781424474073
INF; fault injection attack; side-channel attack
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11311/571452
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