In this paper we investigate three corporate governance issues in 30 Italian family firms: (i) the orientation either to the Agency Theory or to the Stewardship Theory; (ii) the board of directors’ composition; (iii) the ability to involve nonfamily individuals in the company’s management and governance (Openness Index) and the decision-making quality (Extension Index) and we analyze empirical results through a cluster analysis by following the Gubitta and Gianecchini’s approach (2002). Our conclusion suggests that (i) small Italian family firms’ corporate governance systems seem to be consistent with the guidelines suggested by the Stewardship Theory and (ii) Italian family firms’ boards are characterized by a relevant presence of family members.
A corporate governance study on Italian family firms
COLAROSSI, FABRIZIO;GIORGINO, MARCO;VIVIANI, DIEGO
2008-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we investigate three corporate governance issues in 30 Italian family firms: (i) the orientation either to the Agency Theory or to the Stewardship Theory; (ii) the board of directors’ composition; (iii) the ability to involve nonfamily individuals in the company’s management and governance (Openness Index) and the decision-making quality (Extension Index) and we analyze empirical results through a cluster analysis by following the Gubitta and Gianecchini’s approach (2002). Our conclusion suggests that (i) small Italian family firms’ corporate governance systems seem to be consistent with the guidelines suggested by the Stewardship Theory and (ii) Italian family firms’ boards are characterized by a relevant presence of family members.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
