In today’s world, power distribution systems and information and communication technology (ICT) systems are increasingly interconnected, forming cyber–physical power systems (CPPSs) at the core of smart grids. Ensuring the resilience of these systems is essential for maintaining reliable performance under disasters, failures, or cyber-attacks. Identifying critical nodes within these interdependent networks is key to preserving system robustness. This paper applies complex network (CN) theory—specifically degree centrality (DC), closeness centrality (CC), and betweenness centrality (BC)—to a real-world distribution grid integrated with an ICT layer in northeastern Italy. Simulations are conducted across three scenarios: a directed power network, an undirected power network, and an undirected ICT network. Each centrality metric generates a ranking of nodes which is validated using node removal performance (NRP) analysis. In the directed power network, in-closeness centrality and out-degree centrality are the most effective in identifying critical nodes, with correlations of 84% and 74% with NRP, respectively. DC and BC perform best in the undirected power network, with correlation values of 67% and 53%, respectively. In the ICT network, BC achieves the highest correlation (64%), followed by CC at 55%. These findings demonstrate the potential of centrality-based methods for identifying critical nodes and support strategies for enhancing CPPS resilience and fault recovery by distribution system operators.

Critical Node Identification for Cyber–Physical Power Distribution Systems Based on Complex Network Theory: A Real Case Study

Doostinia M.;Falabretti D.;Verticale G.;
2025-01-01

Abstract

In today’s world, power distribution systems and information and communication technology (ICT) systems are increasingly interconnected, forming cyber–physical power systems (CPPSs) at the core of smart grids. Ensuring the resilience of these systems is essential for maintaining reliable performance under disasters, failures, or cyber-attacks. Identifying critical nodes within these interdependent networks is key to preserving system robustness. This paper applies complex network (CN) theory—specifically degree centrality (DC), closeness centrality (CC), and betweenness centrality (BC)—to a real-world distribution grid integrated with an ICT layer in northeastern Italy. Simulations are conducted across three scenarios: a directed power network, an undirected power network, and an undirected ICT network. Each centrality metric generates a ranking of nodes which is validated using node removal performance (NRP) analysis. In the directed power network, in-closeness centrality and out-degree centrality are the most effective in identifying critical nodes, with correlations of 84% and 74% with NRP, respectively. DC and BC perform best in the undirected power network, with correlation values of 67% and 53%, respectively. In the ICT network, BC achieves the highest correlation (64%), followed by CC at 55%. These findings demonstrate the potential of centrality-based methods for identifying critical nodes and support strategies for enhancing CPPS resilience and fault recovery by distribution system operators.
2025
centrality
complex networks
cyber–physical power systems
ICT systems
power distribution grids
resilience
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1295548
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