Post-quantum cryptosystems are often designed starting from a public key encryption algorithm and augmented with widely recognized cryptographic constructions, which in turn are shared among the majority of proposals and create common targets for fault attacks, but also opportunities for overarching countermeasures. In this talk, we survey the fault resilience of these recurring structures in both Key Encapsulation Methods (KEMs) and signature schemes, taking as case studies both the current KEMs selected for the fourth round in the US NIST standardization process, and its on-ramp for post-quantum signatures.

Fault Attacks Friendliness of Post-quantum Cryptosystems

A. Barenghi;G. Pelosi
2023-01-01

Abstract

Post-quantum cryptosystems are often designed starting from a public key encryption algorithm and augmented with widely recognized cryptographic constructions, which in turn are shared among the majority of proposals and create common targets for fault attacks, but also opportunities for overarching countermeasures. In this talk, we survey the fault resilience of these recurring structures in both Key Encapsulation Methods (KEMs) and signature schemes, taking as case studies both the current KEMs selected for the fourth round in the US NIST standardization process, and its on-ramp for post-quantum signatures.
2023
Computer Security, Cryptography, Post-quantum cryptosystems, Cryptographic protocols, Fault attack
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1259142
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