Providing efficient protection against energy consumption based side channel attacks (SCAs) for block ciphers is a relevant topic for the research community, as current overheads are in the 100× range. Unprofiled SCAs exploit information leakage from the outmost rounds of a cipher; we propose a solution encasing it between keyed transformations amenable to an efficient SCA protection. Our solution can be employed as a drop in replacement for an unprotected implementation, or be retrofit to an existing one, while retaining communication capabilities with legacy insecure endpoints. Experiments on a Cortex-M4 μC, show performance improvements in the range of 60×, compared with available solutions.
|Titolo:||Encasing Block Ciphers to Foil Key Recovery Attempts via Side Channel|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2016|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||04.1 Contributo in Atti di convegno|