In this work, we provide an evaluation of the fitness of a cipher implementation for automated, low overhead, Side Channel Attack (SCA) countermeasure insertion through instruction re-scheduling. This evaluation is automated by means of an extension to the Clang/LLVM compiler framework and is thus amenable to be performed on a generic cipher implementation in C.

Enhancing Passive Side-Channel Attack Resilience through Schedulability Analysis of Data-Dependency Graphs

AGOSTA, GIOVANNI;BARENGHI, ALESSANDRO;PELOSI, GERARDO;SCANDALE, MICHELE
2013

Abstract

In this work, we provide an evaluation of the fitness of a cipher implementation for automated, low overhead, Side Channel Attack (SCA) countermeasure insertion through instruction re-scheduling. This evaluation is automated by means of an extension to the Clang/LLVM compiler framework and is thus amenable to be performed on a generic cipher implementation in C.
Network and System Security
9783642386305
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11311/738966
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