Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm which allows the on-demand delivering of software, hardware, and data as services. As cloud-based services are more numerous and dynamic, the development of efficient service provisioning policies become increasingly challenging. Game theoretic approaches have shown to gain a thorough analytical under- standing of the service provisioning problem. In this paper we take the perspective of Software as a Service (SaaS) providers which host their applications at an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provider. Each SaaS needs to comply with quality of service requirements, spec- ified in Service Level Agreement (SLA) contracts with the end-users, which determine the revenues and penalties on the basis of the achieved performance level. SaaS providers want to maximize their revenues from SLAs, while minimiz- ing the cost of use of resources supplied by the IaaS provider. Moreover, SaaS providers compete and bid for the use of in- frastructural resources. On the other hand, the IaaS wants to maximize the revenues obtained providing virtualized re- sources. In this paper we model the service provisioning problem as a Generalized Nash game, and we propose an efficient algorithm for the run time management and alloca- tion of IaaS resources to competing SaaSs.
A Game Theoretic Formulation of the Service Provisioning Problem in Cloud Systems
ARDAGNA, DANILO;
2011-01-01
Abstract
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm which allows the on-demand delivering of software, hardware, and data as services. As cloud-based services are more numerous and dynamic, the development of efficient service provisioning policies become increasingly challenging. Game theoretic approaches have shown to gain a thorough analytical under- standing of the service provisioning problem. In this paper we take the perspective of Software as a Service (SaaS) providers which host their applications at an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provider. Each SaaS needs to comply with quality of service requirements, spec- ified in Service Level Agreement (SLA) contracts with the end-users, which determine the revenues and penalties on the basis of the achieved performance level. SaaS providers want to maximize their revenues from SLAs, while minimiz- ing the cost of use of resources supplied by the IaaS provider. Moreover, SaaS providers compete and bid for the use of in- frastructural resources. On the other hand, the IaaS wants to maximize the revenues obtained providing virtualized re- sources. In this paper we model the service provisioning problem as a Generalized Nash game, and we propose an efficient algorithm for the run time management and alloca- tion of IaaS resources to competing SaaSs.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
