The concept of inductive risk—commonly understood as the possibility of error in accepting or rejecting a scientific hypothesis—has been a topic of discussion in the philosophy of science since the 1950s. The primary focus has been on its implications for the legitimacy of non-epistemic values in science, particularly their role in weighing risks of false positives against false negatives. This paper examines inductive risk through the lens of contemporary risk science. Drawing on recent developments in the conceptualization of risk, it offers new insights into how inductive risk can be assessed and characterized. The analysis is illustrated with the example of testing a new drug. The paper identifies and discusses several strategies for mitigating inductive risk.

A risk science perspective on inductive risk

Malvina Ongaro;
2026-01-01

Abstract

The concept of inductive risk—commonly understood as the possibility of error in accepting or rejecting a scientific hypothesis—has been a topic of discussion in the philosophy of science since the 1950s. The primary focus has been on its implications for the legitimacy of non-epistemic values in science, particularly their role in weighing risks of false positives against false negatives. This paper examines inductive risk through the lens of contemporary risk science. Drawing on recent developments in the conceptualization of risk, it offers new insights into how inductive risk can be assessed and characterized. The analysis is illustrated with the example of testing a new drug. The paper identifies and discusses several strategies for mitigating inductive risk.
2026
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
s11229-026-05759-8.pdf

accesso aperto

: Publisher’s version
Dimensione 818.06 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
818.06 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1331667
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
  • OpenAlex ND
social impact