RISC-V is increasingly considered a strategic architecture for technological sovereignty and long-term platform independence, yet its practical maturity across software, performance and security is still debated. This paper presents an integrated, hardware-grounded assessment of the current RISC-V ecosystem. We first analyze software readiness by examining toolchain fragmentation, operating-system integration, and deployment effort across commercial ASIC boards and configurable FPGA soft-cores. We then benchmark representative processors using CoreMark, Geekbench 6, and SPEC2017, and contextualize the achieved results through direct comparison with contemporary ARM and x86 systems. Finally, we evaluate susceptibility to Transient Execution Attacks on three prominent open-source cores (BOOM, NOEL-V, and CVA6). The results show a clear three-way trade-off. Software support remains heterogeneous: ASIC platforms provide faster bring-up, whereas soft-core deployments require substantial hardware-software codesign effort. From a performance perspective, the best evaluated RISC-V ASIC demonstrates competitive per-cycle efficiency for embedded-class workloads, but a significant gap persists versus high-end proprietary processors; on FPGA soft-cores, low frequency and memory-system constraints often prevent completion of demanding benchmark suites. From a security perspective, all evaluated open-source cores are vulnerable to a subset of transient-execution attacks, with broader attack surfaces associated with more aggressive speculative microarchitectures. Overall, RISC-V is already a deployable opportunity for customizable embedded domains. For high-performance, general-purpose use, closing the gap requires coordinated ecosystem consolidation and rigorous security-by-design co-validation across hardware and software layers.

A real opportunity or still a promise? The current status of the RISC-V ecosystem

Lazzeri, Elia;Cassano, Luca
2026-01-01

Abstract

RISC-V is increasingly considered a strategic architecture for technological sovereignty and long-term platform independence, yet its practical maturity across software, performance and security is still debated. This paper presents an integrated, hardware-grounded assessment of the current RISC-V ecosystem. We first analyze software readiness by examining toolchain fragmentation, operating-system integration, and deployment effort across commercial ASIC boards and configurable FPGA soft-cores. We then benchmark representative processors using CoreMark, Geekbench 6, and SPEC2017, and contextualize the achieved results through direct comparison with contemporary ARM and x86 systems. Finally, we evaluate susceptibility to Transient Execution Attacks on three prominent open-source cores (BOOM, NOEL-V, and CVA6). The results show a clear three-way trade-off. Software support remains heterogeneous: ASIC platforms provide faster bring-up, whereas soft-core deployments require substantial hardware-software codesign effort. From a performance perspective, the best evaluated RISC-V ASIC demonstrates competitive per-cycle efficiency for embedded-class workloads, but a significant gap persists versus high-end proprietary processors; on FPGA soft-cores, low frequency and memory-system constraints often prevent completion of demanding benchmark suites. From a security perspective, all evaluated open-source cores are vulnerable to a subset of transient-execution attacks, with broader attack surfaces associated with more aggressive speculative microarchitectures. Overall, RISC-V is already a deployable opportunity for customizable embedded domains. For high-performance, general-purpose use, closing the gap requires coordinated ecosystem consolidation and rigorous security-by-design co-validation across hardware and software layers.
2026
Proceedings of the European Test Workshop
Performance Analysis
Processors
RISC-V
Security
Transient Execution Attacks
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1323929
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