Attack-defense game of interdependent infrastructure systems considering cascading failures

Interdependent infrastructure networks (IINs) are increasingly vulnerable to potential threats from terrorist activities, which can severely disrupt their performance. The dynamic interactions between intelligent attackers and defenders are crucial in determining the resilience of IINs. Based on game theory and complex network theory, this paper proposes a Stackelberg attack-defense game model considering cascading failures. The proposed two-player game model prioritizes the actions of the defender, with the attacker adopting the role of a follower who formulates a response to the defender’s moves. The strategies and payoffs are defined based on the vulnerability of IINs under disruptions, accounting for cascading failures both within individual networks and between heterogeneous networks. An interdependent power and gas network is applied to explore equilibrium strategies and expected payoffs for both the attacker and defender. Simulation results reveal the importance of considering cascading effects from a network perspective when evaluating the performance of IINs. The findings demonstrate that narrowing the importance gap between nodes is an effective strategy for enhancing system resilience and mitigating the impact of attacks. The equilibrium strategies derived from this model offer valuable insights for improving the resilience of IINs against disruptive events.