Artificial creativity?

Can an artificial intelligence (AI), whose outputs are correlated with humans’ inputs in an extremely opaque way, be thought of as creative? I will answer in the negative, starting with the analysis of the case of Edmond de Belamy, together with further cases. More precisely, I will offer the following three kinds of arguments. First, what results from testing the idea of creative AI against the background of traditional definitions of creativity, especially from a philosophical perspective. Second, what results from testing the idea of creative AI against the background of the notion of meta-sensemaking. Third, what results from testing the idea of creative AI against the background of the epistemology of creativity. After arguing that the possible answer to my starting question is negative, at least in the sense that speaking of creative AI means speaking of something far different from human creativity, I will argue that the reflection upon the idea of creative AI should not make us lose sight of what is most important: what creativity is always for, i.e. making sense of our own existence, from art to anything, not only because it is a kind of existential urgency for us but also because it is pleasant in itself for us.