The Frege-Geach problem is a central issue in metaethics, challenging expressivist theories to justify logical inferences involving moral expressions. Expressivists argue that moral statements express attitudes rather than truth-apt propositions, yet this position struggles with preserving logical coherence in contexts where moral claims are unasserted. Solutions to this problem include Simon Blackburn's approach involving higher-order attitudes, Mark Schroeder's “being for” framework, and Allan Gibbard's theory of factual-normative worlds. Each framework contributes insights, yet a comprehensive resolution may necessitate combining linguistic and pragmatic analyses with metaethical perspectives to clarify inference patterns in expressivist reasoning.
Frege-Geach Problem
D. Chiffi
2025-01-01
Abstract
The Frege-Geach problem is a central issue in metaethics, challenging expressivist theories to justify logical inferences involving moral expressions. Expressivists argue that moral statements express attitudes rather than truth-apt propositions, yet this position struggles with preserving logical coherence in contexts where moral claims are unasserted. Solutions to this problem include Simon Blackburn's approach involving higher-order attitudes, Mark Schroeder's “being for” framework, and Allan Gibbard's theory of factual-normative worlds. Each framework contributes insights, yet a comprehensive resolution may necessitate combining linguistic and pragmatic analyses with metaethical perspectives to clarify inference patterns in expressivist reasoning.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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