The Frege-Geach problem is a central issue in metaethics, challenging expressivist theories to justify logical inferences involving moral expressions. Expressivists argue that moral statements express attitudes rather than truth-apt propositions, yet this position struggles with preserving logical coherence in contexts where moral claims are unasserted. Solutions to this problem include Simon Blackburn's approach involving higher-order attitudes, Mark Schroeder's “being for” framework, and Allan Gibbard's theory of factual-normative worlds. Each framework contributes insights, yet a comprehensive resolution may necessitate combining linguistic and pragmatic analyses with metaethical perspectives to clarify inference patterns in expressivist reasoning.

Frege-Geach Problem

D. Chiffi
2025-01-01

Abstract

The Frege-Geach problem is a central issue in metaethics, challenging expressivist theories to justify logical inferences involving moral expressions. Expressivists argue that moral statements express attitudes rather than truth-apt propositions, yet this position struggles with preserving logical coherence in contexts where moral claims are unasserted. Solutions to this problem include Simon Blackburn's approach involving higher-order attitudes, Mark Schroeder's “being for” framework, and Allan Gibbard's theory of factual-normative worlds. Each framework contributes insights, yet a comprehensive resolution may necessitate combining linguistic and pragmatic analyses with metaethical perspectives to clarify inference patterns in expressivist reasoning.
2025
Reference Module in Social Sciences
978-0-443-15785-1
Assertion, Ethics, Expressivism, Inference, Non-cognitivism, Norms
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1296629
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