Network slicing is a key 5G technology that enables multiple virtual networks to share physical infrastructure, optimizing flexibility and resource allocation. This involves Mobile Network Operators (MNO), Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), and end users, where MNO leases network slices to MVNOs, and then provides customized services. This work considers end-to-end network slicing with a focus on fair sharing and financial-related power efficiency, modeled as a twolevel hierarchical combinatorial auction. At the upper level, an MNO auctions slices to competing MVNOs, while at the lower level, MVNOs allocate resources to end users through their own auctions. Dynamic user requests add complexity to the process. Our model optimizes resource allocation and revenue generation using a pair-bid mechanism and Vickrey-Clarke- Groves (VCG) pricing. The pair-bid approach enhances competition and efficiency, while VCG ensures truthful bidding based on marginal system impact. Simulations validate the model's effectiveness in resource distribution and financial performance, showing a 1 2. 5 % revenue improvement over the baseline.

Pair-Bid Auction Model for Optimized Network Slicing in 5G RAN

M. Li;S. Troia;G. Maier
2025-01-01

Abstract

Network slicing is a key 5G technology that enables multiple virtual networks to share physical infrastructure, optimizing flexibility and resource allocation. This involves Mobile Network Operators (MNO), Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), and end users, where MNO leases network slices to MVNOs, and then provides customized services. This work considers end-to-end network slicing with a focus on fair sharing and financial-related power efficiency, modeled as a twolevel hierarchical combinatorial auction. At the upper level, an MNO auctions slices to competing MVNOs, while at the lower level, MVNOs allocate resources to end users through their own auctions. Dynamic user requests add complexity to the process. Our model optimizes resource allocation and revenue generation using a pair-bid mechanism and Vickrey-Clarke- Groves (VCG) pricing. The pair-bid approach enhances competition and efficiency, while VCG ensures truthful bidding based on marginal system impact. Simulations validate the model's effectiveness in resource distribution and financial performance, showing a 1 2. 5 % revenue improvement over the baseline.
2025
2025 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC)
979-8-3315-2420-3
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1292146
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