Exercises in alterity. Nurturing alterity for a design ethic

Attention to otherness runs through much of the history of philosophy and the social sciences. It first appeared in the modern world with colonialism and more recently with some of the painful consequences of its domination, the most obvious of which are migratory flows and the constant flare-up of outbreaks of war. The tools of global communication have then gradually made multiple aspects of cultural diversity known. A problematic and contradictory consequence, but at the same time a potential asset, is the emergence of multicultural, multi-ethnic, intersectional societies. Contemporary societies are increasingly confronted with that which is Other than oneself, that which poses questions that one is not accustomed to answering, that which poses itself as a term of contradiction, questioning established certainties and beliefs. We can learn from philosophy and the social sciences that interest in otherness lies between the epistemological dimension (“how we can know”) and the ethical dimension (“how we should act”). In the first case, otherness is a drive to explore what lies beyond our limits, in an “other territory”; in the second, otherness leads us to the encounter with subjects who are inevitably “other than us”, and for this reason requires us to recognise each other as well as to assume mutual responsibility. Reflection on otherness also inevitably leads to the abandonment of all pretensions to centralism, because it places every subjectivity in a network of relationships devoid of hierarchies and supremacies. In concrete terms, the acceptance of a culture founded on the recognition of otherness and the mutual responsibility that this requires, leads (utopianly?) to the emergence of anthropocentrism and androcentrism, but also of Eurocentrism and logocentrism, here understood as the domination of a few forms of communication over all others. Design does not have the power to directly alter this state of affairs, at least as long as it is predominantly thought of as an aid to the production of goods and commodities. But it could have the possibility of affecting what is defined as “common sense” if we start from the idea that artefacts, especially when loaded with symbolic values, are bearers of meaning, vehicles of values and promoters of beliefs. Indeed, the meaning of an artefact lies not only within its visual and material configuration but above all in the practical consequences it entails. Artefacts tell of the human imprint left by the way we conceive our relationship with the Umwelt. The shape of cities, technical tools, clothing, the production of images and writings and all other kinds of artefacts are chapters of this narrative. Otherness thus poses three complementary questions to design: (i) why do we design?, (ii) how do we conceive the artefact?, (iii) for whom do we design?. The succession of these three questions follows the pragmatist, performative view of language: when saying actually corresponds to doing. In particular, I refer to the perlocutionary aspect of language (also of the language of artefacts), that which concerns the consequences provoked and the results obtained through any act of communication. The first question concerns the intentions of the project action as much as the ends for which it is intended. The second relates to the product of the project, to how it should present itself. The third is the one that is of most interest here and involves in particular the theme of otherness: every project is relationship. The question of for whom one plans in fact calls into question both the principle of responsibility and the disposition to recognition. This chapter proposes an explication and a semiotic examination of the three questions, as well as their application in the perspective of a designing habit that is formed and developed within a culture of otherness. It is not a question of defining methodologies or drawing up guidelines, but rather of proposing some “otherness exercises” in the formation of the designer. For example: 1) The exercise of dialogue, because this constitutes the main access route to that which presents itself as other than us. Knowing how to dialogue or how to deal efficiently with dialogical confrontation is in fact not always a correctly employed practice. Often, the illusion of knowing how to dialogue prevails, when in fact the confrontation, rather than dialogical, is oriented towards making one’s own assumptions and beliefs prevail. Instead, every dialogical act is a questioning of knowledge and an exposure to non-knowledge. 2) A second exercise concerns seeing beyond the obvious, or Roland Barthes’ “obtuse sense”. Indeed, knowing how to see beyond the obvious leads one to develop a vision beyond pre-understanding, to see what lies beyond prejudice, stereotypes, and the uncritical legacy of tradition. But also, in a perspective of abductive and inventive semiosis, to glimpse the Possible beyond the mere phenomenal datum. 3) A third exercise concerns the disposition to translation, not only linguistic or inter-semiotic, but also as a crossing of the “semiodiversity” of cultures, as a continuous confrontation with what is surprising, as a detachment from the comfort of the familiar world.