Network slicing is an important characteristic of 5G/6G networks that increases flexibility and enables different applications over a single infrastructure. The physical resources are partitioned to create virtualized networks, each dedicated to services with specific requirements. Several entities participate in network slicing, including Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), and users. An MNO owns the physical network infrastructure and the resources. MVNOs lease resources from the MNO and operate as service providers towards their subscribers. The goal of this work is to optimize the end-to-end network slicing process to provide services to users with a fair sharing of resources. We model this problem as a hierarchical combinatorial auction with a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pricing mechanism. In the upper-level auction, an MNO is the seller supplying Network Slice to several MVNOs, who act as the bidders. In the lower-level auction, each MVNO holds an auction as a seller delivering services to their subscribed end-users, who play the role of bidders. We formulate and solve theWinner Determination Problem using mathematical programming and heuristic algorithms. The simulations show that the model can achieve fair sharing of resources, and it enables improving the MNO and MVNO revenue.

Auction-based network slicing for 5G RAN

Troia, S;Pattavina, A;Maier, G
2023-01-01

Abstract

Network slicing is an important characteristic of 5G/6G networks that increases flexibility and enables different applications over a single infrastructure. The physical resources are partitioned to create virtualized networks, each dedicated to services with specific requirements. Several entities participate in network slicing, including Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), and users. An MNO owns the physical network infrastructure and the resources. MVNOs lease resources from the MNO and operate as service providers towards their subscribers. The goal of this work is to optimize the end-to-end network slicing process to provide services to users with a fair sharing of resources. We model this problem as a hierarchical combinatorial auction with a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pricing mechanism. In the upper-level auction, an MNO is the seller supplying Network Slice to several MVNOs, who act as the bidders. In the lower-level auction, each MVNO holds an auction as a seller delivering services to their subscribed end-users, who play the role of bidders. We formulate and solve theWinner Determination Problem using mathematical programming and heuristic algorithms. The simulations show that the model can achieve fair sharing of resources, and it enables improving the MNO and MVNO revenue.
2023
2023 IEEE 9th International Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft)
979-8-3503-9980-6
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1258895
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