Experimental results on the Ultimatum Game indicate that receivers may reject non-zero offers, even though that seems irrational. The explanation is that, when players are treated unfairly, they can act against strict rationality. This paper discusses an evolutionary model of the Ultimatum Game describing how populations of players change their behaviour in time. We prove an analytical result that establishes under what conditions receivers tend to reject unfair offers. The response to unfair offers is also shown to be sensitive to different degrees of unfairness. We then introduce a Bayesian game to translate our result from populations to individual players.

Changing behaviour under unfairness: An evolutionary model of the Ultimatum Game

Arioli, Gianni;Lucchetti, Roberto;Valente, Giovanni
2024-01-01

Abstract

Experimental results on the Ultimatum Game indicate that receivers may reject non-zero offers, even though that seems irrational. The explanation is that, when players are treated unfairly, they can act against strict rationality. This paper discusses an evolutionary model of the Ultimatum Game describing how populations of players change their behaviour in time. We prove an analytical result that establishes under what conditions receivers tend to reject unfair offers. The response to unfair offers is also shown to be sensitive to different degrees of unfairness. We then introduce a Bayesian game to translate our result from populations to individual players.
2024
Fairness Rational behaviour Evolutionary game theory Dynamical evolution
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1256087
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