Side-channel attacks are a concrete and practical threat to the security of computing systems, ranging from high performance platforms to embedded devices. In this work, we will provide a brief systematization of the current existing approaches to analyze the side-channel vulnerability of an implementation, or automatically implement countermeasures, relying on methodologies typical of compiler systems. We will dedicate a spotlight to a significant progress in the countermeasures techniques which is represented by the application of dynamic compilation techniques to prevent a side-channel attacker from devising a model of the attacked application. We conclude the work highlighting promising research directions in this field.
Compiler-based Techniques to Secure Cryptographic Embedded Software against Side Channel Attacks
G. Agosta;A. Barenghi;G. Pelosi
2020-01-01
Abstract
Side-channel attacks are a concrete and practical threat to the security of computing systems, ranging from high performance platforms to embedded devices. In this work, we will provide a brief systematization of the current existing approaches to analyze the side-channel vulnerability of an implementation, or automatically implement countermeasures, relying on methodologies typical of compiler systems. We will dedicate a spotlight to a significant progress in the countermeasures techniques which is represented by the application of dynamic compilation techniques to prevent a side-channel attacker from devising a model of the attacked application. We conclude the work highlighting promising research directions in this field.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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