Active sharing of wireless infrastructure can be an effective approach to reduce costs and improve network profitability. However, schemes proposed so far neither guarantee network operators the autonomy to compete and differentiate themselves in various market segments, nor give infrastructure providers the economic resources to keep the network updated in terms of technology and capacity. In this work, we propose a techno-economic model that allows network operators to compete and dynamically select the quality target to deliver to their customers, while simultaneously seeking to maximize their profits. In order to understand the willingness of network operators to participate in such a scenario, we develop a non-cooperative game wherein the Nash Equilibria show the propensity of operators to meet the customers' requirements. This work also points out the importance of retaining independent regulatory bodies, within the new business ecosystem, charged with proposing pricing policies capable of incentivizing investments towards infrastructure upgrades.
|Titolo:||Making the case for dynamic wireless infrastructure sharing: A techno-economic game|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2017|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||04.1 Contributo in Atti di convegno|