We introduce a Security Game with a single static guard that is supported by a number of spatially imperfect alarms. We model this setting with two non-cooperative games modeling two different strategic interactions between a Defender and an Attacker. In the first one the Defender has to respond to an activated alarm given its current position (Alarm-Response Game). In the second one, the Defender has to determine the best static placement from which undertakes any alarm response (Guard-Placement Game).

Strategic guard placement for optimal response to alarms in security games

BASILICO, NICOLA;GATTI, NICOLA
2014-01-01

Abstract

We introduce a Security Game with a single static guard that is supported by a number of spatially imperfect alarms. We model this setting with two non-cooperative games modeling two different strategic interactions between a Defender and an Attacker. In the first one the Defender has to respond to an activated alarm given its current position (Alarm-Response Game). In the second one, the Defender has to determine the best static placement from which undertakes any alarm response (Guard-Placement Game).
2014
13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
9781634391313
9781450327381
Game Theory (cooperative and non-cooperative); Surveillance and Security; Artificial Intelligence
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1005122
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