We introduce a Security Game with a single static guard that is supported by a number of spatially imperfect alarms. We model this setting with two non-cooperative games modeling two different strategic interactions between a Defender and an Attacker. In the first one the Defender has to respond to an activated alarm given its current position (Alarm-Response Game). In the second one, the Defender has to determine the best static placement from which undertakes any alarm response (Guard-Placement Game).
Strategic guard placement for optimal response to alarms in security games
BASILICO, NICOLA;GATTI, NICOLA
2014-01-01
Abstract
We introduce a Security Game with a single static guard that is supported by a number of spatially imperfect alarms. We model this setting with two non-cooperative games modeling two different strategic interactions between a Defender and an Attacker. In the first one the Defender has to respond to an activated alarm given its current position (Alarm-Response Game). In the second one, the Defender has to determine the best static placement from which undertakes any alarm response (Guard-Placement Game).File in questo prodotto:
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