Non-cooperative bargaining is modeled as an extensive-form game with uncertain information and infinite actions. Its resolution is a long-standing open problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. We provide an algorithm to solve bargaining with any kind of one-sided uncertainty. Our algorithm reduces a bargaining problem to a finite game, solves this last game, and then maps its strategies with the original continuous game. Computational complexity is polynomial with two types, while with more types the problem is hard and only small settings can be solved in exact way. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Non-cooperative bargaining with arbitrary one-sided uncertainty

CEPPI, SOFIA;GATTI, NICOLA;IULIANO, CLAUDIO
2013-01-01

Abstract

Non-cooperative bargaining is modeled as an extensive-form game with uncertain information and infinite actions. Its resolution is a long-standing open problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. We provide an algorithm to solve bargaining with any kind of one-sided uncertainty. Our algorithm reduces a bargaining problem to a finite game, solves this last game, and then maps its strategies with the original continuous game. Computational complexity is polynomial with two types, while with more types the problem is hard and only small settings can be solved in exact way. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing
9783642348884
9783642348884
Business and International Management; Modeling and Simulation; Control and Systems Engineering; Information Systems and Management; Information Systems; Management Information Systems; Business, Management and Accounting (all)
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11311/1005046
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