MARCHESI, ALBERTO
 Distribuzione geografica
Continente #
NA - Nord America 963
EU - Europa 490
AS - Asia 93
AF - Africa 5
SA - Sud America 5
Continente sconosciuto - Info sul continente non disponibili 1
Totale 1.557
Nazione #
US - Stati Uniti d'America 955
IT - Italia 220
AT - Austria 65
ES - Italia 61
JO - Giordania 41
DE - Germania 38
IE - Irlanda 29
CN - Cina 25
GB - Regno Unito 23
SE - Svezia 20
FI - Finlandia 18
VN - Vietnam 14
CA - Canada 8
HK - Hong Kong 6
BR - Brasile 5
CI - Costa d'Avorio 5
BE - Belgio 4
FR - Francia 4
NL - Olanda 3
IL - Israele 2
RU - Federazione Russa 2
UA - Ucraina 2
AE - Emirati Arabi Uniti 1
EU - Europa 1
IN - India 1
IR - Iran 1
JP - Giappone 1
LI - Liechtenstein 1
SG - Singapore 1
Totale 1.557
Città #
Chandler 192
Fairfield 81
Vienna 62
Málaga 61
Ashburn 60
Ann Arbor 52
Wilmington 42
Amman 41
Woodbridge 39
Houston 38
Seattle 37
Milan 33
Redmond 32
Lawrence 30
Dublin 29
New York 29
Cambridge 28
Grafing 26
Princeton 24
Dearborn 20
Verona 18
Helsinki 14
San Diego 13
Dong Ket 10
Como 9
Guangzhou 9
London 9
Rome 7
Medford 6
Ottawa 6
Redwood City 6
Segrate 6
Abidjan 5
Beijing 5
Brindisi 5
Cortenuova 5
Norwalk 5
Brussels 4
Hong Kong 4
Lappeenranta 4
Shanghai 4
Washington 4
Bra 3
Falkenstein 3
Miami 3
Reggio Nell'emilia 3
São Paulo 3
Americana 2
Arcore 2
Blacksburg 2
Bologna 2
Boydton 2
Cagliari 2
Casalgrande 2
Caserta 2
Cervia 2
Chicago 2
Edinburgh 2
Erba 2
Garching 2
Hefei 2
Montréal 2
Monza 2
Parma 2
Acton 1
Albany 1
Barnaul 1
Cittiglio 1
Collegno 1
Columbus 1
Cormano 1
Cornaredo 1
Dubai 1
Genoa 1
Grassobbio 1
Haifa 1
Hounslow 1
Kashan 1
Kunming 1
Lanzhou 1
Nanjing 1
Orzinuovi 1
Paris 1
Philadelphia 1
Pittsburgh 1
Portland 1
Rio Saliceto 1
San Giuseppe Vesuviano 1
Schaan 1
Serra 1
Shaoxing 1
Southampton 1
Southwark 1
Tsimshatsui 1
Urbana 1
Zocca 1
Totale 1.195
Nome #
Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers 101
Bilevel Programming Approaches to the Computation of Optimistic and Pessimistic Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Equilibria. 89
Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy 83
Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games 82
Trembling-Hand Perfection in Extensive-Form Games with Commitment 78
A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria 73
Computing a Pessimistic Stackelberg Equilibrium with Multiple Followers: The Mixed-Pure Case 72
Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games 65
Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games 59
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibrium Reoptimization 54
Online Bayesian Persuasion 51
Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions 49
Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders 46
Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders 44
Exploiting Opponents Under Utility Constraints in Sequential Games 42
Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contracts 39
Learning Probably Approximately Correct Maximin Strategies in Simulation-Based Games with Infinite Strategy Spaces 39
No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium 37
Computing Correlated Strategies to Commit to with Multiple Leaders 37
Learning Probably Approximately Correct Maximin Strategies in Games with Infinite Strategy Spaces 36
Decentralized No-regret Learning Algorithms for Extensive-form Correlated Equilibria (Extended Abstract) 33
Bayesian agency: Linear versus tractable contracts 31
Learning Maximin Strategies in Simulation-Based Games with Infinite Strategy Spaces 30
Learning Maximin Strategies with Best Arm Identification Techniques 30
Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion 30
Learning to Correlate in Multi-Player General-Sum Sequential Games 30
Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry 29
Online Posted Pricing with Unknown Time-Discounted Valuations 25
Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions 23
Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: Handling adversarial receiver’s types under full and partial feedback models 18
A Unifying Framework for Online Optimization with Long-Term Constraints 18
Trembling-Hand Perfection and Correlation in Sequential Games 16
Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization 15
Sequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark 15
Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting 14
Simple Uncoupled No-regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-form Correlated Equilibrium 14
Efficiency of Ad Auctions with Price Displaying 14
Safe Learning in Tree-Form Sequential Decision Making: Handling Hard and Soft Constraints 12
The Power of Media Agencies in Ad Auctions: Improving Utility through Coordinated Bidding 11
Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium 11
Signaling in Posted Price Auctions 9
Designing menus of contracts efficiently: The power of randomization 8
Constrained Phi-Equilibria 2
Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion 2
Persuading Farsighted Receivers in MDPs: the Power of Honesty 1
Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling 1
Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes 1
Totale 1.619
Categoria #
all - tutte 7.650
article - articoli 1.926
book - libri 0
conference - conferenze 5.724
curatela - curatele 0
other - altro 0
patent - brevetti 0
selected - selezionate 0
volume - volumi 0
Totale 15.300


Totale Lug Ago Sett Ott Nov Dic Gen Feb Mar Apr Mag Giu
2018/201935 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 20
2019/2020171 10 7 1 12 26 24 35 17 17 9 9 4
2020/2021234 5 12 13 5 12 2 40 13 9 75 18 30
2021/2022293 6 17 47 10 32 29 8 9 21 38 40 36
2022/2023583 36 40 30 41 95 54 4 44 123 68 38 10
2023/2024219 9 48 16 36 15 36 16 17 3 23 0 0
Totale 1.619