

1 **SHARED VALUE CREATION DURING SITE DECOMMISSIONING:**

2 **A CASE STUDY FROM THE ENERGY SECTOR**

3 Arena Marika^a, Azzone Giovanni^b, Piantoni Giulia^c

4 ^aPolitecnico di Milano, Department of Management Economics and Industrial Engineering, Via
5 Lambruschini 4b 20156 Milano. marika.arena@polimi.it

6 ^bPolitecnico di Milano, Department of Management Economics and Industrial Engineering, Via
7 Lambruschini 4b 20156 Milano. giovanni.azzone@polimi.it

8 ^cPolitecnico di Milano, Department of Management Economics and Industrial Engineering, Via
9 Lambruschini 4b 20156 Milano. giulia.piantoni@polimi.it

10
11 **Highlights**

- 12 • A role-shift is emerging for firms carrying out site decommissioning processes
- 13 • Firms' proactivity can foster shared value creation during site decommissioning
- 14 • Shared value in site decommissioning is not automatically created
- 15 • Activation, Integration and Co-design strategies can be applied

21 **Abstract**

22 Recent trends of globalization and industrial relocation have made the issue of industrial site
23 decommissioning increasingly urgent.

24 The outcome of decommissioning processes is generally highly dependent on the “economic status”
25 of the specific industrial site, with a high risk for those sites that have low land value and high
26 reclamation costs of being simply abandoned by the site owners. This represents a lose-lose
27 situation, both for the companies that have to close their sites and the neighbourhood.

28 To overcome this situation, some firms are starting to implement more proactive strategies, for
29 supporting shared benefits in site remediation. Nevertheless, research is still scant on the
30 consequences of such emerging solutions and on whether and how they can create shared value.

31 To fill this gap, the paper studies the evolution of the decommissioning strategy of an Italian energy
32 company (Energ.IT), that started to take on a more proactive role to foster site redevelopment. The
33 case analysis is articulated around the conceptual elements of the Social Resource Based View:
34 resources, capabilities, stakeholders, interactions and outcome, identifying three different strategies,
35 defined as *Activation*, *Integration or Co-design* and appraising, in a qualitative way, their impact on
36 shared value and the conditions that make each strategy feasible.

37

38 **Keywords**

39 Site decommissioning, Shared Value, Social Resource Based View, Case study, Energy industry

40

41 **1. Introduction**

42 Today in Europe there are around 3 million abandoned industrial sites and, according to recent
43 researches, they are expected to grow further (EEA, 2014). This figure represents one of the
44 unintended consequences of the industrial reconversion processes, whereby, in past years, many
45 companies modified and relocated their business activities, passing through the decommissioning of
46 entire industrial areas (Hou and Al Tabbaa, 2014; Invernizzi et al., 2017).

47 The outcome of a decommissioning process¹ is highly dependent on the “*economic status*”
48 (CABERNET, 2006) of the areas to be dismissed, in terms of location, size and risks position
49 (Schädler et al., 2012). Some sites have high land value and low reclamation costs, which enable the
50 owners to quit the areas successfully through market arrangements (e.g. sale to other organizations,

¹ The term decommissioning is here used in a broad sense to refer to the process that that starts after announcing the shutdown of industrial plants.

51 privately funded projects, real estate initiatives). In other cases, low land value (e.g. isolated areas)
52 and high reclamation costs (wide in size, polluted...) make sites unprofitable for the owners and
53 unattractive for potential buyers (CABERNET, 2006; Dixon et al., 2006; Hou and Al-Tabbaa,
54 2014). Consequently, these sites typically cannot be dismissed through market arrangements and
55 require public intervention for remediation (CABERNET, 2006). As public resources are shrinking,
56 less valuable sites are often left-behind, becoming “grey areas”, neglected ruins of *Cathedrals in the*
57 *Desert*. They generate “lose-lose situations”, with negative impacts for both local communities and
58 the original site’s owner. On the one hand, abandoned sites could cause social and environmental
59 problems, decreasing the overall quality of life in the area (Dixon, 2006; Schädler et al., 2012;
60 Cappuyins, 2016). On the other hand, they affect the reputation of site owners (Favi et al., 2016),
61 whose image is linked to the areas where they used to operate. Indeed, today companies are more
62 than ever constrained and influenced by the pressures exerted by their stakeholders (Mitchell et al.,
63 1997; Beckmann et al., 2014; Perko et al., 2017), who increasingly demand for socially and
64 environmentally sustainable behaviours (Onkila, 2011; Maltz et al., 2011; Dobele et al., 2014;
65 Brookes and Locatelli, 2015; Invernizzi et al., 2017).

66 From this point of view, the plain “abandonment” option as a possible outcome of the
67 decommissioning process is clearly not in line with stakeholders’ expectations, stimulating
68 companies to search for approaches that could limit their liability. Some companies began to
69 introduce advanced accountability tools while managing the phase out of their settlements (Nehring
70 and Cheng, 2016; Invernizzi et al., 2017; Espinoza and Morris, 2017). This primarily consists in a
71 more structured interaction with the stakeholders during the decommissioning process (Invernizzi et
72 al., 2017), with early involvement of both who could be more impacted by the decommissioning,
73 and who could replace the original owners in the redevelopment phase. In addition, there is also
74 anecdotal evidence² of the possibility of transforming decommissioned industrial sites through
75 reconversion and social innovation processes with the original owners of the sites taking on more
76 proactive roles aimed to foster replacement and redevelopment (JRC, 2015).

77 However, the consequences of these emerging solutions have not been deeply explored or
78 questioned yet, and there is no evidence whether they simply limit a potential reputational damage
79 for the companies or are able to create win-win situations, leading to shared benefits for both

² Some cases that support such anecdotal evidence are, for instance: Drax Plc (https://www.drax.com/press_release/drax-moves-closer-coal-free-future-unit-four-conversion/); Novamont (<https://www.novamont.com/il-modello-novamont>), Arkema with the LCC30 project (<https://www.arkema.com/en/media/news/news-details/Launch-of-Lacq-Cluster-Chimie-2030-an-exemplary-redevelopment-of-the-Lacq-industrial-basin/>).

80 companies and local communities i.e., in the words of Porter and Kramer (2011), creating shared
81 value (SV).

82 Such research gap leads to our first research question, i.e. *can a company create SV, intended as the*
83 *capacity to enhance its competitiveness while simultaneously advancing the economic and social*
84 *conditions of the communities, in the decommissioning phase?*

85 Furthermore, in case the answer to the first question is positive, a second issue emerges. The
86 empirical evidence shows that companies could adopt different operational strategies to take on a
87 more proactive role in the decommissioning phase, and an analysis of the conditions that make such
88 strategies successful is missing. This consideration leads to our second research question, i.e. *which*
89 *strategies are available in the phase out and what conditions are relevant for creating SV?*

90 To answer to these research questions, we carried out a longitudinal case study (Yin, 2014),
91 concerning one of the main Italian energy companies (named here as Energ.IT).

92 The energy sector appears particularly interesting to analyse the issue of decommissioning, because
93 the drastic changes occurring in the field of renewable energy from a policy and technological
94 perspective are forcing companies either to convert less efficient fossil-based power plants or to
95 decommission them. Under the pressure of these industry dynamics, Energ.IT had to understand
96 how to manage the transition of 24 industrial sites, heterogeneous in size and located in diverse
97 Italian regions. The company addressed the issue of decommissioning with the explicit strategic
98 intent of creating SV, and, in order to achieve this objective, adapted its strategy over time,
99 according to the specificities of different sites and to what they learnt from previous trials. Such
100 evolution makes the case particularly suitable to explore alternative ways of proactively addressing
101 the phase out and the underlying conditions that could (or could not) lead to create SV.

102 To analyse the case, the paper exploits the theoretical lenses of the *Social Resource Based View*
103 proposed by Tate and Bals (2016). This framework grounds on the recent developments of the
104 *Resource Based Theory* and models SV creation, by considering how a firm leverages on different
105 resources and capabilities and interacts with its stakeholders (JRC, 2015; Invernizzi, et al. 2016;
106 Perko, et al. 2017). Accordingly, for each strategy adopted by the company we analysed how
107 Energ.IT addressed the issue of decommissioning in terms of resources and capabilities mobilised,
108 stakeholders involved and interactions between the company and the stakeholders. For each
109 strategy, we also analysed outcomes in terms of SV creation, providing a qualitative evaluation of
110 the benefits for the company and the communities, and the conditions that influenced the
111 achievement of different results.

112 The remainder of the article structures as follows: Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework
113 used for guiding the empirical analysis. Materials and methods (case selection and data collection)

114 are presented in Section 3 and case findings described in Section 4. Finally, we discuss implications
115 in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6.

116

117 **2. Theoretical background**

118 The theoretical framework of this paper is provided by the *Social Resource Based View* (SRBV) of
119 Tate and Bals (2016). Such framework grounds on the *Resource Based View* (RBV) and proposes
120 an overall theoretical base that integrates the economic issues (deriving from the RBV) with the
121 environmental and the social ones.

122 According to RBV (Barney, 1991; Peteraf and Barney, 2003), firms can obtain sustainable
123 competitive advantages and create shareholders' value by combining and managing tangible and
124 intangible resources that are Valuable, Rare, Inimitable and Non-substitutable (VRIN), through the
125 actions of an efficient Organization (VRIN/O; Barney, 1991; Litz, 1996; Kraaijenbrick et al., 2010).
126 While sharing the idea that resources are the source of value creation, Tate and Bals (2016)
127 underline two main limits of the RBV:

- 128 • Focusing on internal resources, owned by a company, RBV underestimates the role of
129 interactions between companies and stakeholders in creating value;
- 130 • Besides, RBV measures value as economic results for shareholders, somehow neglecting the
131 idea that corporate performance should cover not only economic, but also environmental
132 and social objectives (Bowen, 1953; Carroll, 1979).

133 To deal with such issues, SRBV extends the domains of the RBV, introducing a shift in the
134 objectives of the firm, here defined according to the *triple bottom line framework*, i.e. adding
135 environmental and social value to economic value. Tate and Bals (2016) also point out that to
136 achieve such objectives, a company must have not only internal resources, but also social and
137 relational capabilities, defined as “the capability to leverage internal or external stakeholder
138 relationships with the goal of reciprocal exchange” (Tate and Bals, 2016, p.6).

139 In brief, the SRBV framework grounds on five conceptual elements, which are particularly relevant
140 to articulate our analysis: *expected outcome, resources, capabilities, stakeholders, interaction with*
141 *the stakeholders*. Below, we explain their relevance for our study, highlighting some specificities
142 that are derived from prior literature in the field of decommissioning and brownfield.

143 Moving from the first element, according to the vision of SRBV that states results should be
144 measured under an economic, environmental and social perspective, we assume that the ultimate
145 *outcome* of an organization is the creation of SV, as the capacity to enhance its competitiveness
146 while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions of the communities (Porter and

147 Cramer, 2011). In the specific field of analysis, this focus means that, to understand and appreciate
148 the outcome of the decommissioning process, we need to consider not only how and to what extent
149 the company is able to ensure the ability of the site owner to make money from the selling of the
150 site, but also how environmental and social impacts are incorporated and dealt with in the closing
151 plan.

152 As second element, *resources* - either tangible or intangible - should be valuable, non-substitutable
153 and socially complex (Tate and Bals, 2016). In the case of decommissioning processes, a first set of
154 resources are related to the industrial plant to be decommissioned and are land, buildings, facilities
155 (tangible), skills, knowhow, human resources (intangibles). However, according to the broad view
156 of SRBV, we should consider as resources also company assets located in other places, that could
157 be used to complement what is on site.

158 The third element, *Capabilities*, represents an organization's ability of individuating, managing and
159 bundling resources. We will use it to describe the ways a company uses to create value from
160 available resources. Some preliminary evidence in the field of site decommissioning shows that,
161 more proactive companies leverage capabilities as project management and stakeholders'
162 involvement (Invernizzi et al., 2017), accountability and modelling (Nehring and Cheng, 2016);
163 stakeholder engagement (Espinoza and Morris, 2017).

164 The fourth element is represented by the set of *stakeholders* involved. As previously highlighted,
165 the SRBV calls for the enlargement of this domain. Specifically, stakeholders provide funding,
166 expertise, products, context shaping (institutions) (Tate and Bals, 2016). In this connection,
167 literature concerning brownfield and decommissioning proves the relevance of involving actors
168 with different competencies and backgrounds such as local administrators, community groups,
169 NGOs, land owners, professional advisors, experts (CABERNET, 2006; Ferber et al., 2006;
170 Norrman et al., 2016).

171 Lastly, there are the *interactions* among stakeholders. The SRBV emphasizes the significance of the
172 structural and relational qualities of the organization's social ties, for overcoming the juxtaposition
173 of social and sustainability concerns with commercial bottom-lines. This brings higher attention to
174 how and when these social ties are built and developed, especially between stakeholders
175 (CABERNET, 2006) and the site owner (Hou and Al Tabbaa, 2014; Invernizzi et al., 2017).

176 In synthesis, applying the SRBV to site decommissioning requires studying its five core conceptual
177 elements as shown in Table 1, which summarizes the dimensions that will be investigated through
178 the empirical analysis.

179 Table 1. Dimensions of the SRBV framework and their synthetic adoption when applied to the research issue

Conceptual elements and their specificities	
Outcome	Economic Environmental Social
Resources	Valuable (Barney, 1991) From non-valuable to valuable: Identification of hidden value of resources that are going to be re-valued according to the reuse option considered. Non Valuable: Tangible or Intangible resources that will be discarded.
Capabilities	Identification of capabilities available / put in place for bundling resources, thus achieving the outcome. Economic: e.g.: Project management, planning, financing Environmental: e.g.: Pollution prevention, sustainable development Social: e.g.: Stakeholders engagement (Tate and Bals, 2016)
Stakeholders	Actors involved and enlargement of the domain. Economic: e.g.: Shareholders, Managers Environmental: e.g.: Environment, Environmental committee Social: e.g.: Local communities, Public administration, Experts
Interaction with Stakeholders	How interactions are structured and fostered When they take place (before the shut-down, decommissioning, remediation, redevelopment...)

180

181 3. Materials and Methods

182 The research method grounds on a single *longitudinal case study* (Yin, 2014), which aims at
 183 inducing from real observations insights about whether and how firms can create SV during
 184 decommissioning. We analysed the case of one of the main Italian energy companies (here called
 185 Energ.IT) that since 2015 started dealing with the decommissioning of 24 marginal sites in Italy.
 186 This case has been selected for three main motivations.
 187 First, the energy industry is crucial per se. The energy sector employs in Europe 1.6 mln people and
 188 adds a value of € 250 billion to the European Economy (European Commission, 2019). In recent
 189 years, energy production and consumption have undergone drastic changes, concerning both the
 190 energy offer (increased competition after market liberalization, adoption of renewables) and the
 191 demand side (reduced energy consumption, increased efficiency and attention to sustainability
 192 issues). In this scenario, policy makers at the international level promoted the diffusion of low
 193 carbon innovative technologies (EU Sustainable Development Strategy framework). As a
 194 consequence, the Italian government in 2017 put the target of reaching 28% of renewables in energy
 195 consumption by 2030, and strengthening security of supply while phasing out coal generated
 196 electricity by 2025 (MISE, 2017). Therefore, the entire market, assets and energy production
 197 systems have been impacted, requiring companies and entities to deal with the decommissioning of
 198 entire production sites (JRC, 2015).

199 Second, the selected case is relevant for the potential impact that the phenomenon under
200 investigation has. The sites in decommissioning were responsible of an overproduction of 13 GW,
201 with a gross power installed ranging from 88 MW to 3.600 MW and cover an area of about 30
202 million sqm spread over all the Italian territory, employing, in peak years, more than 3.400 people³.
203 In addition, these sites are located in scarcely inhabited zones, where the activity of the plant had
204 historically driven the economic sustainability of communities. Therefore, their phase-out is crucial:
205 it represents both a potential risk and a key opportunity for entire areas.

206 Third, the specific case is peculiar because the company addressed the issue of decommissioning
207 with the explicit strategic intent of creating SV and adapted its strategy over time. While performing
208 a strategic shift towards openness and sustainability, the firm modified its way of facing
209 decommissioning, using different approaches and instruments for managing the phase out of
210 different sites. In this respect, the selected case offers the opportunity of comparing different
211 strategies and related results.

212 To answer the RQs, we focused the analysis on 7 sites that are paradigmatic of the different
213 strategies implemented by the company. Data were collected about three main embedded units of
214 analysis: i) the firm (Energ.IT), ii) the decommissioning project, iii) seven selected decommissioned
215 industrial sites, triangulating *multiple sources of proof* (Yin, 2014).

216 Specifically, secondary data were collected accessing both publicly available documents (website,
217 annual and sustainability reports of the company, news – *LexisNexis*, ISTAT and demo.istat for
218 national statistics) and not publicly available ones. Among data that are not publicly available,
219 authors could access to internal presentations and reports, detailed technical documentation on the
220 sites to be decommissioned and on regeneration proposals.

221 Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews. Interviews lasted around an hour
222 and most of them were recorded and transcribed. Informants include company employees
223 (Energ.IT's CEO, the Head of Communication, the Sustainability Manager, the Responsible of the
224 Decommissioning project - Project Coordinator) and other stakeholders (as presidents / vice
225 presidents of industry associations, public authorities). The interview protocol was diversified
226 depending on the type of interviewee (see Appendix B for an example of interview guidelines
227 followed). Concerning internal stakeholders, interviews aimed at exploring how the company was
228 addressing the issue of the site decommissioning in connection to the conceptual elements

³ The employment figure has been computed considering the average number of employees for MW installed in power plants with diverse production technologies (combined cycle, coal, burning oil).

229 introduced in section 2. Concerning external stakeholders, the interviews explored the engagement
230 mechanisms put in place by the company. Further insights were collected through direct
231 observation, during site visits and participation to some project activities.

232 Data, collected as described above, were then summarised and analysed thematically (Miles and
233 Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2011). To this aim a coding procedure was used, referring to the
234 conceptual elements identified in section 2: expected outcome, resources, capabilities, stakeholders,
235 interaction with the stakeholders.

236 As concerns the outcome, a quantitative evaluation, in terms of economic, social and environmental
237 achieved benefits was not feasible, since the development of decommissioning processes are still
238 ongoing. Hence, we evaluated the results of different strategies in a qualitative way, analysing their
239 impacts on the main value drivers for the firm (e.g. reputation, reduction of decommissioning costs,
240 valorisation of land) and for the community (e.g. time for individuating a feasible solution, potential
241 contribution for the local development).

242 The results emerging from the analysed interview data are discussed in the section 4.

243

244 **4. Case analysis**

245 In this section, the case company is briefly described and then the different strategies implemented
246 by the company to manage the site decommissioning are illustrated with reference to the theoretical
247 lens of the SRBV.

248 *4.1 The case company and the case sites*

249 Energ.IT is the main Italian electricity provider, active in the Italian and Latin America. The
250 company employs around 69.000 people (28.000 of which in Italy); in 2018 it made more than
251 75.000 mln € revenues and generated 250 TWh (39% by renewables).

252 In last years, in line with the dynamics of the sector and policy requirements, the company has
253 revised its strategy (posing high emphasis on sustainability and innovation) and modified its
254 organizational structure accordingly.

255 Since the beginning of the 21st century, Energ.IT, as many other companies in the energy sector, has
256 been dealing with *overproduction*. As a consequence of over-capacity determined by the
257 liberalization of the Italian electricity and gas markets (2003-2007) and growing incentive-based
258 investments in renewable energy sources, entire plants became redundant and obsolete. In 2015, the
259 company started a project to strategically cope with this problem, aiming at reducing dismissal
260 costs, preserving its own reputation and valorising land.

261 The company was able to easily sell only a few sites, usually small and located in competitive areas
262 (CABERNET, 2006). Conversely, for most wide sites, located in isolated areas and complex socio-
263 economic contexts, the company was not able to manage the decommissioning process through
264 straightforward market arrangements and a more proactive approach was needed. Such approach
265 evolved over time, gradually widening the set of resources used to create SV and increasing the
266 involvement of stakeholders.

267 To present and discuss the evolution of the company's strategy, we refer to seven sites under
268 decommissioning, that can be considered paradigmatic of three different approaches. Table 2
269 reports key site-related data: size of the area to be decommissioned ($23.522 \cdot 10^3$ sqm), installed
270 capacity (overall 8.982 MW), employees occupied in the power plants, geographical location, size
271 of the areas where the power plants are placed (number of residents on 1st January 2019)⁴.

⁴ Data extracted from [demo.istat](http://demo.istat.it/pop2019/index.html), ISTAT, on the number of residents on 1st January 2019 by municipality, province and region. The amount has been benchmarked with the last ISTAT census of 2011. Available at <http://demo.istat.it/pop2019/index.html> [November 2019]

272 Table 2. Overview of the sites decommissioned by Energ.IT in three phases. The table shows details on the size, technology, employees⁵, location. We specify by municipality,
 273 province and region hosting the plant: number of residents [N.Res.] (demo.istat, 1st January 2019); employment⁶ / unemployment rate⁷ [E.R., U.R.] (ilSole24Ore, elaborations on
 274 MEF data for municipal data, ISTAT 2018 for provincial and regional ones).

275 As reference, consider that in Italy in 2018 there were 60.357k residents; employment rate = 58,5%; unemployment rate = 10,61% [ISTAT].
 276

Phase	Site	Size [ksqm = sqm*10 ³]	Gross Power installed [MW]	Technology	Employees	Municipality			Province			Region		
						N. Res. [k people]	E.R. %	U.R. %	N. Res. [k people]	E.R. %	U.R. %	Name	N. Res. [k people]	E.R. %
I	A	66	176	Gas Turbine	25	93,6	65,06	421,3	64,58	10,03	Piedmont	4.365,4 k	65,89	8,22
	B	3.800 (plant: 2.350)	2.640	Thermoelectric with burning oil	634	9,5	61,98	234,9	64,38	6,85	Veneto	4.905,9 k	66,65	6,45
II	C	900 (plant: 240)	690	Thermoelectric, combined cycle	97	7,0	59,30	170,9	66,44	7,18	Piedmont	4.365,4 k	65,89	8,22
	D	690,7 (plant: 388)	1.738	Thermoelectric with burning oil and gas	418	36,6	62,35	705,7	41,36	23,50	Calabria	1.947,1 k	42,15	21,60
III	E	2.000	3.600	Thermoelectric with burning oil	864	8,9	66,89	317,0	55,92	11,84	Lazio	5.879,1 k	60,91	11,14
	F	16.000 (30.000 overall)	n.a.	Mining Area Lignite extraction	n.a.	M1: 23,4 M2: 9,5	70,18 73,33	P1: 1.011,3 P2: 342,6	69,69 64,74	5,82 9,32	Tuscany	3.729,6 k	66,53	7,34
	G	65	88	Gas Turbine	13	7,9	54,60	221,2	54,33	11,21	Molise	305,6k	53,45	12,99

277

⁵ The employment figure has been computed considering the average number of employees for MW installed in power plants with diverse production technologies (combined cycle, coal, burning oil).

⁶ E.R.: employment rate is calculated by ISTAT as the ratio between the employed population (15-64 years old) and the total population in the same class age.

⁷ U.R.= unemployment rate is calculated by ISTAT as the ratio between people looking for a job and labour force in a specific area

278 These sites are very different and cover a wide spectrum of possible technologies, size and installed
 279 capacity. Focusing on location, all sites (but A) are hosted by small municipalities and quite far
 280 from highways or other infrastructure: they are typically surrounded by rural areas, agricultural
 281 fields and naturalistic parks (see Appendix C). Some of these sites are characterised by difficult
 282 socio-economic situations at provincial level (as sites D, E, G), where economic activities are
 283 highly fragmented, scarcely diversified and where unemployment rates are higher than the national
 284 average (Table 3).

285

286 Table 3. The table shows the evolution in 15 years of unemployment rate by province hosting the site . Rows in the
 287 table are ordered from the lowest to the highest unemployment rate by province in 2018. Last row provides national
 288 data as reference.

Site	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
F	4,9	4,6	4,4	3,6	4,5	5,0	4,7	5,9	7,0	8,1	7,7	7,7	8,0	6,8	5,8
B	6,1	6,3	4,5	3,8	3,4	3,3	6,0	5,5	9,2	8,5	9,3	8,5	8,7	8,3	6,8
C	4,7	5,0	3,6	4,2	4,4	5,2	5,8	6,3	11,0	11,9	11,1	9,6	9,0	9,6	7,2
F	4,5	5,5	4,9	4,6	4,9	5,5	5,9	6,0	7,3	8,0	9,3	10,3	9,2	9,7	9,3
A	5,3	5,4	4,6	4,6	4,8	5,8	5,3	6,6	10,4	11,7	13,4	11,5	10,8	11,6	10,0
G	11,5	10,4	10,3	8,0	9,5	9,4	8,6	10,7	13,6	16,4	13,9	14,4	13,4	14,2	11,2
E	8,1	9,0	7,4	8,8	9,7	11,4	10,6	10,5	12,4	15,4	15,6	13,7	14,9	13,0	11,8
D	10,6	12,1	12,1	10,5	11,0	10,9	12,5	12,2	20,4	23,3	27,8	22,5	23,7	21,2	23,5
ITALY	8,0	7,7	6,8	6,1	6,7	7,7	8,3	8,4	10,7	12,1	12,6	11,9	11,7	11,3	10,6

289

290 Above data show that in 2012-2013, when most Energ.IT's plants closed, unemployment rate
 291 increased in all areas and, in some cases, the situation has not recovered yet (Site D).

292

293 4.2 Energ.IT Case: Activation

294 Initially, the company's strategy was focused on communicating the availability of the sites for new
 295 uses, launching *calls for ideas*. The company assumed that this could "activate" projects, providing
 296 a new future for the sites and demonstrating to local authorities and citizens the commitment of the
 297 company towards the local community.

298 "We want to show that we care about this area. [...] We want to demonstrate that even if
 299 we are closing the plant, other activities can flourish and bring value to the community"
 300 [Project manager]

301 Coherently with these objectives, the requirements for submitting ideas were loose, resulting in a
 302 high number of collected proposals (more than 100 in the first area). They ranged from a retirement
 303 home, a museum, amusement parks, different types of multifunctional centers etc.

304 The ideas were evaluated by a commission, made up by the Head of Business Development of
305 Energ.IT, two university professors, and two representatives of the local entities. The commission
306 selected the three best ideas, based on broad evaluation criteria (economic, social and
307 environmental sustainability). The “winner” of the call was a proposal for a new extreme sport park.
308 Overall, the initiative was well received by the local authorities and by the citizens; however, after
309 the completion of the competition, it became clear that the proponents had no intention to go on and
310 develop a real project, leaving the issue of redevelopment open.

311 “It was a key moment for deeply listening to local communities [...]. However, [...] we
312 found ourselves equipped with brilliant ideas, but unable to find someone willing to realize
313 them”. [Project manager]

314 According to the SRBV framework, the *resources* levered by the company in this approach are
315 partly related to the site and partly to the company. The formers include some physical assets, in
316 particular the land and part of the built infrastructure (big fuel tanks) and they became part of the
317 proposed projects for the redevelopment phase. The latter include those resources owned by the
318 company, not site-specific, and exploited for enacting and managing the *call for ideas*. They are
319 mainly intangible and include the company’s reputation, communication infrastructure (website and
320 media connection), knowledge of the site and its context (the company operated in the area from
321 1979 up to 2013; Appendix D.).

322 The *capabilities* used to combine resources are mainly related to communication and stakeholder
323 management. In this phase, Energ.IT strategy was mainly aimed at limiting the company’s liability
324 towards the local community. The *call for ideas* was an instrument used to communicate to citizens
325 and local authorities (i.e. those stakeholders that could be negatively affected by the closure of the
326 plant) that even if the company was closing the plant, it was not leaving a negative legacy. On the
327 contrary, the company wanted to demonstrate that “many other things could still happen here”
328 (Project manager). From this point of view, Energ.IT put in place an approach that could ensure the
329 visibility of the initiative, to foster a broad participation. This approach obviously required also
330 mobilizing the stakeholder management capability, to coordinate and respond to pressures set by the
331 main *stakeholders*. However, it is worthy of noticing that, in this phase, no (potential) investors
332 were explicitly involved in the process.

333 *The interaction with stakeholders* took place at different stages. At the beginning, the company met
334 the local representatives, to share the process and the main steps, and it organized a public
335 presentation to communicate the project to the citizens. During the evaluation phase, the company
336 involved local representative as part of the evaluation committee, hence establishing a bidirectional
337 interaction, while collecting feedbacks and suggestions from them.

338 “The involved actors are many. Local communities are for sure involved since the first
 339 steps” [Project manager]

340 The *outcome* of the process was controversial. The ideas collected through the call appeared
 341 interesting for supporting the redevelopment of the site, but they were far from being translated into
 342 real projects. This was mainly due to the lack of a structured economic pre-feasibility study and of
 343 an ex-ante identification and involvement of potential investors. In part, this situation was
 344 determined by a gap between the expectations of the company and of the participants to the *call for*
 345 *ideas*. Such gap impeded the realization of the selected proposals.

346 “The participants expected us to invest in their projects and finance the new activity.
 347 Instead, we never meant to do something similar. That’s not our business.” [Project
 348 coordinator]

349 From this point of view, the strategy was not really able to achieve the expected outcome that the
 350 company was pursuing: there is no reduction of decommissioning costs, nor valorization of land.
 351 Moreover, the reputational effect was positive only at the beginning, but it risked becoming a
 352 boomerang once the solution was not realized. For the community, there were initial apparent
 353 benefits, since the project seemed developing fast. However, when unfeasible ideas were selected, it
 354 revealed its low potentialities, thus highlighting that to really initiate redevelopment a different
 355 approach was needed.

356 “Things do not happen on their own. We have to make sure that there is someone that care
 357 about these projects and that is really interested in putting them in place and to ensure that
 358 they will be completed. If there are no investors that participate to the project, we do not
 359 have any guarantee that the project will be completed. We do not want that something starts
 360 and then the project is left half-done.” [Project manager]

361 Table 3. Analysis of the *Activation* strategy based on the SRBV framework

Resources	Valuable	Intangible: reputation, image, communication infrastructure, knowledge of the site.
	From non-valuable to valuable	Tangible assets, land and built infrastructure; Human Resources: relocated
	Non Valuable	Machinery and buildings; technological facilities; skills related to the specific technology (obsolete)
Capabilities	Economic	Planning, Evaluating, Technical Expertise
	Environmental	Sustainable reconversion as a strategic objective Pollution prevention
	Social	Mission-driven: commitment of the company as outlined in its mission statement; Communication and involvement of locals to present the opportunity
Stakeholders	Economic	Shareholders, Managers, Energ.IT’s head of business development, project coordinator;
	Environmental	Environment, Experts (university professors)

	Social	Local communities, public administration, assessors, local schools, universities
Interaction with Stakeholders	When	Before decommissioning starts, to share materials and information After selection, to share results of evaluation
	How	Experts invited to participate to call for ideas; Sharing of materials on a proper webpage + transparent communication; Expert, local administrators and managers participated to evaluation commissions
Outcome: SV	Economic	No project finalized, no investors involved: costly for the company and not valuable for the area. Initial positive reputational effects for the firm, but increased risks of negative boomerangs
	Environmental	No project finalized; no land reclamation nor valorization
	Social	No project finalized; raised awareness and participation on the issue, but enlargement of time needed and solutions with low potentialities

362

363

4.3 *Energ.IT Case: Involvement*

364

365

366

367

368

369

370

371

372

373

374

375

376

377

378

379

380

381

382

383

384

Afterwards, the company decided to use a different approach for the decommissioning of four sites: B, C, D, E. They are not very different in size, gross power and technology (Table 2). Compared to Site A, they are bigger, located in more isolated, and poorly inhabited areas. The four sites are all inserted in local economies driven by agricultural activity and tourism. However, their contexts differ by geographical location, unemployment rate (Table 3) and socio-economic structure (the situation is more positive for Site B and C, while particularly critical for site D).

In order to stimulate the development of feasible projects, the company tried to identify and involve from the beginning who could possible design innovative solutions.

“With this approach we aim to move a step further towards redevelopment. We want to make sure that those that present a project, they really intend to do it and to finish it.”

[Project manager]

Consistently, proponents were required through a *call for projects* to present a more complete project (compared to the *Activation* strategy) and to demonstrate their ability of realizing it, developing a preliminary feasibility plan and identifying and involving investors (and detailing the sources of founding) before submitting the proposal. Proponents were also asked to sign a binding agreement for the acquisition of the site. Coherently with these requirements, more detailed site materials and technical information were accessible.

For each site, a specific commission was set up, including three members of the local entities, (municipality, province and region), two Energ.IT managers, and three university professors. They were in charge of evaluating the proposals, on the basis of sustainability - social, financial, environmental - and innovation drivers.

385 Through the call, Energ.IT looks for projects that “satisfy mainly two criteria: innovation
386 and sustainability. [...] Why innovation? Because we hope that the new business activities
387 that could be developed on the site could keep on sharing their future with the local
388 territory for the next 50 years” [Project coordinator]

389 In this case, the commission did not select one project, but just decided whether they were
390 acceptable or not, or specified some conditions or requirements to be integrated in the development
391 of the project. Most of these constraints and requirements were posed by the representative of the
392 local entities, and professors of the local universities and aimed at integrating the “vocation” of the
393 context (i.e. leveraging on natural parks and biodiversity, traditional agricultural activities,
394 production and research districts...)

395 “The projects should consider the vocation of the site, the history of the site.” [Member of
396 the commission]

397 “Some of the projects that were presented suffered from a limited involvement of the local
398 stakeholders. [...] When the projects were presented the representatives of the local entities
399 provided a critical reading of some parts of the proposals, suggesting possible corrections in
400 order to consider the results of past initiatives, or to incorporate their feelings about what
401 kind of activities could be more coherent with the needs and the expectations of the local
402 communities” [Member of the commission]

403 After this step, the company started a confrontation with the proponents of the acceptable projects
404 in order to: verify the integration of the above requirements, support in refining the projects and
405 reach with proponents an economic agreement for the acquisition of the site.

406 The *resources* levered in this strategy are mainly land and part of the physical infrastructure (again,
407 tanks and some parts of the power plants) that could preserve the remembrance of the past function
408 of the area. As before, the company levered on its image and reputation, and on its communication
409 infrastructure to foster the interest of proponents. Moreover, also the firm’s knowledge of the site
410 and the local context are leveraged to both evaluate the proposals and support the proponents in
411 refining them (i.e. making them more in line with the expectations of the local communities). This
412 implies that Energ.IT structured multiple channels for communication to identify hidden value for
413 the territory of available resources.

414 *Capabilities* were linked to a structured and open communication with and management of
415 stakeholders (as in *Activation* strategy), as well as to the introduction of a “mission driven
416 approach”. In this respect, the proactive management of decommissioning began to be considered
417 as a way to make explicit Energ.IT’s new mission, which is based on openness, inclusion and
418 sustainability.

419 “[This strategy and Energ.IT’s new vision] are permeated reciprocally. One of them is the
420 theory, the other the practice: they are extremely integrated, they are the same thing. They
421 are the same concepts on different levels”. [Project coordinator]

422 Finally, the company levered also on its capabilities of financial analysis and investment decisions,
423 supporting proponents with the incorporation of requirements and constraints put forth by the
424 representatives of local entities.

425 The set of involved *stakeholders* was enlarged, including investors, to grant the existence of funders
426 for proposals and the *interaction with the stakeholders* was more intense than before. Before
427 launching the *call for projects*, the company met the local representatives, organized some public
428 events to present and promote the initiative and levered on the media (newspapers; web) to
429 communicate what was going on. In this respect, the company augmented communications and the
430 number of events, but did not change their scope (to inform the stakeholders). During the evaluation
431 phase, the company involved the local representative as part of the evaluation committee. The
432 stakeholders provided feed-backs, suggestions, and posed constraints to the projects. After the
433 completion of the evaluation, the company interacted directly with the proponents to make sure that
434 the requirements of the evaluation commission were incorporated in the projects.

435 “It is a long and complex process, that lasts even after the contract has been signed. It is a
436 process done hand in hand with investors” [Project manager]

437 The *outcomes* of this strategy were controversial. On the one hand, the projects that were presented
438 were more feasible; but obviously the number of the proposals was much lower (for each site from
439 2 to 6 proposals were presented). On the other hand, the proposed projects had not always been
440 drafted according to the needs and peculiarities of the local context and this gap emerged only
441 during the evaluation of the projects thanks to the confrontation with the stakeholders.

442 “In this case, the commission was tougher. In general, there was a high expectation that
443 these projects would have been implemented. As a consequence, the local representatives
444 paid high attention to all the details of the projects and put forth different constraints,
445 asking for assurance by the company about the possibility of modifying the projects.”
446 [Member of the evaluation commission]

447 As a result, the whole process became quite long, leading to a progressive refining of the proposals.
448 Specifically, outcomes were positive only in some cases, when the company could actually have a
449 positive reputational return and reduce costs, with the community experiencing the fast realization
450 of interesting projects (Site B and C). Conversely, for Site D even additional efforts of the firm
451 could not bring positive results.

452

453 Table 4. Analysis of the *Involvement* strategy based on the SRBV framework

Resources	Valuable	Intangible: reputation, image, communication infrastructure, knowledge of the site.
	From non valuable to valuable	Land, infrastructure, tangible assets: leveraged according to the peculiarities of the territory and the proposals. HR: relocated in other open positions
	Non Valuable	Intangible assets, machinery
Capabilities	Economic	Accounting, investment decision
	Environmental	Pollution prevention, reclamation
	Social	Stakeholders management, mission driven, inclusion through the opening of new communication channels
Stakeholders	Economic	Bodies of the economic development, shareholders, Energ.IT's managers
	Environmental	Environment, governmental agencies, bodies of environment
	Social	Population, majors, council members, Politecnico di Milano and University of the territory, assessors, Region, Province
Interaction with stakeholders	When	Before decommissioning starts; During the evaluation procedure. After the evaluation procedure for refining the selected proposals.
	How	Experts invited to take part to call for projects + investors involved since the beginning; Transparent communication: materials available on a dedicated webpage; Commissions evaluate and refine presented projects; Technical support of experts and Energ.IT's managers to grant the feasibility of the project and its realization
Expected outcome: SV	Economic	Twofold: feasible project starts, but sometimes the process is longer and more expensive than expected (reputational boomerang)
	Environmental	Land reclamation and pollution decreased + raised awareness only in successful cases
	Social	Raised awareness and participation of local communities Acceptance of the proposals and legitimacy when there was a fast approval of interesting solutions

454

455 *4.4 Energ.IT Case: Co-design*

456 A further evolution, was followed later on two quite diverse sites (F and G), where the company co-
457 designed the future for the area with local stakeholders and potential partners.

458 “The previous experiences made evident that we need to anticipate the phase of stakeholder
459 engagement, and we need to find a way for incorporating in the calls the requirements of
460 the local stakeholders, in order to avoid to collect projects that are not in line with the
461 expectations”. [Project manager]

462 The company decided to introduce this strategy, for the first time, for managing the closure of a
463 wide ex-mine area (Site F). Decommissioning and remediating that area was perceived as
464 particularly challenging for Energ.IT, since the mine and the related facilities expanded over
465 multiple municipalities and embraced artificial lakes, woods, industrial facilities and infrastructure
466 of various kind (see Appendix C).

467 To cope with the fragmentation and diversity of resources to be managed, a more participatory
468 approach was adopted. First, local stakeholders were preliminary interviewed for identifying
469 interesting and feasible redevelopment options. After that, potential scenarios for the area were
470 formulated by Energ.IT's consultants, then refined during workshops and individual meetings with
471 stakeholders. In particular, the company involved ex-ante representatives from local companies,
472 research centers and academia, local community.

473 At the end, a masterplan for the area was developed by the company itself that maintained a
474 coordination role. The area was divided into main zones and a schedule for the launch of a *call for*
475 *projects* was prepared incorporating the requirements emerged from the stakeholder engagement.
476 This extensive ex-ante stakeholders involvement increased time and costs in the first phases of the
477 decommissioning process and also introduced challenges and risks.

478 "We anticipate costs a lot. And this is a great risk. [...] The risk of being unsuccessful is high, also
479 because the authorizations needed are many, as well as the actors to involve. [...] Listening to them is a
480 non-avoidable starting point. If it works, it then brings advantages, but it can also become a hurdle:
481 listening to everyone risks inducing a paralysis." [Project manager]

482 Nevertheless, this strategy enabled structuring proposals in line with the vocation and need of the
483 territory, thus enhancing acceptance and accelerating further decommissioning steps.

484 The same process has been applied to decommission a very diverse, but highly challenging site: Site
485 G. Indeed, despite being much smaller than F, it is located in a quite poorly inhabited and socio-
486 economically complex context. As learnt with the scarce success of Site D, the company
487 approached the decommissioning of Site G with a more participatory approach: an initial and
488 integrated involvement of key stakeholders was perceived as needed to avoid future delays and
489 unacceptance.

490 The *resources* levered in the *Co-design* strategy were: part of the site infrastructure, machinery (i.e.
491 for an open air museum in Site F), paths and trails of the mining area. The company also levered on
492 the employees of the mine area, to support the development of the master plan, of contacts and
493 negotiations with local communities and public authorities. This was done to foster a positive
494 climate around the initiative and required mobilizing also external resources to co-design a solution
495 with the territory.

496 Sites under analysis are, for diverse reasons, very complex: the company was asked to anticipate
497 some decisions, having scarce information while proactively including multiple players with
498 different needs. Therefore, concerning *capabilities*, strong project management, negotiation,
499 involvement and co-design were required.

500 In line with this, the number of *stakeholders* involved was large. Beside the representative of the
501 local entities and communities, also some local companies, associations, tourist operators, sport

502 associations were involved in the stakeholders' workshops. This means they were not only informed
 503 during events, but also interviewed ex-ante. Taking part in workshops, stakeholders contributed to
 504 the formulation of the final scenario, then used for the development of the masterplan, and, in turn,
 505 as basis for the individuation of specific fields for the collection of proposals.

506 The first step of the remediation process was complex and slow. Indeed, the company had to face
 507 typical problems connected to stakeholder engagement and exposed itself to the risk of initiating a
 508 confrontation with stakeholders that were negative towards the initiative.

509 "We had to put around a table many people, that had different interest. Some of them were
 510 suspicious, in the beginning, because they thought that we were just looking for a way to
 511 spend less money in the remediation. That's not true. We only want to spend our money
 512 better and be sure that something will happen here". [Project manager]

513 However, results are by now positive for the firm (in terms of reputation, reduction of
 514 decommissioning costs and valorization of land) and the territory. Indeed, despite the initial time
 515 needed increased, this process resulted in a final masterplan that was well received by the local
 516 communities and by the representative of the local municipalities. Furthermore, the company
 517 decided to keep a project management role for the start-up of the masterplan, making clear that it
 518 was investing in the area also to facilitate the activation of a new life for the site. Hence, acceptance
 519 increased and pressures started for putting the masterplan in place. At present, the remediation
 520 projects are not concluded and the company is launching the first calls. These calls are coordinated
 521 with the masterplan, with a clear vision for the redevelopment of the area and this vision stemmed
 522 also from the confrontation with local needs and expectations.

523 Table 5. Analysis of the *Co-design* strategy based on the SRBV framework

Resources	Valuable	External resources approached through co-designing + communication, knowledge of the site
	From non valuable to valuable	Land, infrastructure, tangible assets: leveraged according to the peculiarities Soft skills and knowhow individuated and leveraged
	Non Valuable	Intangible assets
Capabilities	Economic	Accounting, investment decision, decommissioning, project management,
	Environmental	Pollution prevention, land remediation
	Social	Stakeholders management, mission driven, inclusion, communication and negotiation for mobilizing external resources, co-design
Stakeholders	Economic	Bodies of the economic development, shareholders, Energ.IT's managers, investors
	Environmental	Environment, governmental agencies, bodies of environment, experts
	Social	Local population, Majors, Council members, Politecnico di Milano and University of the territory, associations
Interaction with stakeholders	When	Before decommissioning starts; Before the definition of the call for proposals;

	How	During and after evaluation procedure; during reclamation and refinement of selected proposals; Interviews performed with: representatives of local communities, public administration and experts, to identify feasible areas of interest for proposals; Experts invited to take part workshop for reasoning upon the main areas of remediation individuated; Experts invited to take part to call for projects (with specific areas of interest) + investors involved; Transparent communication: material available on a dedicated webpage; Commissions evaluate and refine presented projects; Technical support of experts and Energ.IT's managers to grant the feasibility of the project and its realization
Expected outcome: SV	Economic Environmental Social	Feasible project starts: the massive involvement is expensive and time demanding at the beginning, but a faster project realization is expected: reduced costs overall and improved reputation Land reclamation and pollution decreased + raised awareness Longer initial phases and complexities BUT Raised awareness and participation of local communities; expected improvement of quality of life and neighborhoods, acceptance of the proposals (defined in line with the peculiarities of the territory)

524

525

5. Discussion

526 The analysis of Energ.IT's decommissioning strategy provides empirical evidence to answer to the
527 initial research questions: *can a company create SV in the decommissioning phase? If yes, which*
528 *strategies are available and what conditions are relevant for creating SV?*

529 Concerning the first research question, the case shows that creating SV during the decommissioning
530 phase is possible, but it is not automatically achievable. The results of the *Activation* strategy
531 demonstrate that making the site available for reuse (even if for free) and communicating this
532 opportunity extensively is not enough to realise a feasible solution. The main motivation of this
533 failure can be found in a misalignment between the expectations of the site owner and those of the
534 participants to the *call for ideas* that implicitly assumed that the company would have acted as an
535 investor. On the other hand, the case also provides evidence of the possibility of creating SV, under
536 certain conditions, through both the *Involvement* and the *Co-design* strategy. In the *Involvement*
537 strategy the company can create SV by: i) unveiling the opportunities opened by resources whose
538 value is somehow hidden; ii) supporting actors in understanding whether and how such resources
539 can be functional for implementing solutions. In the *Co-design* strategy, the firm can create SV by
540 directly contributing to the design of the second life of the site and by making available non-site
541 related resources.

542 Moving to the second research question, the case of Energ.IT provides evidence of three different
543 strategies that are characterised by some distinctive features, relevant in explaining SV creation. In
544 particular, the strategies are diversified in terms of the range of resources (site and company

545 related), that are exploited for remediation. Moving from the *Activation* to the *Co-design* strategy,
546 not only land and infrastructure, but also soft intangible assets started being positively re-valued
547 (i.e. the “soul” of the area, workers’ skill), a shift that is closely connected to the ability of the
548 company and other stakeholders of identifying “hidden value” of resources. Similarly, the set of
549 *capabilities* used by the company to support the decommissioning is different, including in
550 *Involvement* and more intensively in *Co-design* capabilities such as: mission driven and
551 participatory approach, intentionality, negotiation, technical evaluations, investment decisions and
552 project management. The modification of the set of capabilities reflects the role change of the
553 company, that leverages on capabilities that are usually not leveraged during site decommissioning,
554 despite being commonly used in the normal operations of a company. Finally, the strategies are
555 distinguished by the width of the panel of involved *stakeholders* and *the intensity and directionality*
556 *of interactions*. Both internal and external ones were engaged since the beginning, but investors and
557 financiers, who assumed a prominent role in the *Involvement* and *Co-design* strategies. In parallel,
558 also the intensity, frequency and directionality of *involvement* was enhanced, which is fundamental
559 for awareness and acceptance.

560 Finally, considering the conditions that are relevant for creating SV, the results show that the
561 success / failure of different strategies depend on both the features of the three approaches
562 (highlighted above) and some contextual factors: the uncertainty and the complexity of the site that
563 should be decommissioned and the alignment of the interests of the local stakeholders in connection
564 to redevelopment projects.

565 In particular, the *Activation* strategy, generating limited SV, can only be adopted when the objective
566 of the company is the minimization of negative reputational effects in the short term

567 The *Involvement* strategy should be preferred when uncertainty and complexity are quite limited
568 and when the local stakeholders share a similar vision about the future of the area and the
569 redevelopment opportunities. In this case, the company can rely on its own knowledge of the site,
570 analyse which available resources could be exploited to answer to the needs of the local
571 communities and open up a channel of communication to facilitate the individuation of initiatives
572 for the re-development coherent with the expectations of the stakeholders.

573 However, when the level of the complexity and uncertainty increases, this approach risks that
574 projects end up not capturing the desires of the local stakeholders. Under these conditions, results
575 are controversial and time enlarges, due to subsequent negotiation and refinement.

576 Instead, the *Co-design strategy* is more suitable in cases of high complexity and uncertainty. This
577 strategy mobilizes external resources to design with the local community a project for the site and
578 grounds on an extensive and structured dialogue between the company and the stakeholders for the

579 identification and redesign of redevelopment initiatives for the area. This anticipated involvement
 580 may inflate initial time and costs, because it surfaces potential contrasts since the beginning.
 581 However, in this way, it reduces risk and delays in the execution phase and drives higher potential
 582 benefits, since it helps sustaining SV creation thanks to links tied with the territory (Tate and Bals,
 583 2016). Overall, *Co-design* is not necessarily always the best strategy, since its successful application
 584 requires a, sometimes highly complex, initial convergence among diverse stakeholders.

585 Table 6. The table highlights, by phase, the main conditions of success and failure (features and contextual factors) for
 586 each strategy and qualitative outcomes reached. They refer to the value drivers we identified in connection to the firms'
 587 and community's objectives.

Strategy by phase	Conditions of success	Conditions of failure	Outcome	Firm's reached objective	Community's reached objective
<i>I</i>	Limited mobilization of resources and capabilities; Transparency and effective communication of opportunities; Knowhow of the territory; Involvement of local stakeholders; Site available for free for reuse; Not enormous uncertainty nor complexity of the site and its context;	Scarce revaluation of intangible assets; Misalignment between the expectation of the company and participants; No investors involved, nor the company acted as such;	Minimization of negative effects No pre-feasibility study; No project realization	No cost reduction; No land valorisation; Initial positive reputational effect, but risk of later negative boomerang.	Enlargement of time needed; Projects with low potentialities.
<i>II</i>	Intangible assets valued, as the "soul" of the area; Application of company's capabilities: knowledge of the site, project management, technical evaluation, mission driven approach and communication (new channels opened); Increased transparency and sharing of technical material; Involvement of investors; Uncertainty and complexity limited.	Directionality of interactions remains unchanged: from the firm to stakeholders; Proposals evaluated with no ex-ante involvement in defining solutions; Acceptance taken for granted; Crucial when complexity increases (wide areas; unstable socio-economic context; fragmented actors and interests, not clear vocation...).	Twofold Feasible projects individuated and initiated only in some cases; Risk of low acceptance of proposals and need of renegotiations	Positive reputational impact, cost reduction only in successful cases; in cases with low acceptance, time and risks increased: no fast land valorisation, and reputational boomerang	Fast approval of solutions vs. no accepted solutions

III

Mobilization of external resources and skills; Structured co-design processes; Intentionality driving company's role change; Capabilities leveraged: negotiation, investment decision, project management, co-design; Ex-ante proactive involvement (interviews, workshops); High level of complexity and uncertainty.

More time and effort (cost, people...) needed in the first phases; Risk of initial paralysis and complexity in managing multi-actor decision systems to reach initial convergence

Positive TBL: Proposals in line with the vocation of the territory; Higher acceptance Faster overall remediation.

Positive reputational effect; Overall decommissioning cost and time reduction, High initial effort. Valorisation of land and areas

Longer initial phases, but joint individuation and co-design of relevant projects.

588

589

590

6. Conclusions

591 This paper addresses the issue of SV creation during site decommissioning. As discussed above, SV
592 cannot be automatically achieved by just making sites available for reuse, but it can be actually
593 reached, though under certain conditions, through *Activation*, *Involvement* or *Co-design* strategies.

594 In particular, the Co-design strategy has the highest potential benefits, but it requires that both the
595 firm and institutions put more effort since initial phases. This is crucial when underestimating
596 initial stakeholders' alignment risks blocking the project later on, thus increasing overall time and
597 costs for realization.

598 From a practical perspective, findings can be relevant for managers and policy makers dealing with
599 the problem of decommissioning in the energy sector and also in other ones, as the strategies that
600 emerged from the analysis and the related success / failure factors are not sector nor country
601 specific. In particular, the research provides managers with evidence-based examples of strategies
602 for SV creation in decommissioning and individuates more general conditions of applicability. This
603 can support managers in changing their attitude towards the identification and deployment of
604 resources (internal and external), capabilities (economic, environmental and social), and ex-ante
605 interactions with territories for shaping SV creation strategic processes. Furthermore, the analysis
606 can also suggest policy makers to think about the opportunity of introducing dedicated measures
607 aimed at stimulating companies to take on proactive role for supporting such processes.

608 Concerning theoretical contributions, first, the paper originally joins the literature on brownfield
609 redevelopment (CABERNET, 2006; Schädler et al, 2012; Stezar, et al., 2013), which traditionally
610 focused on the role of public actors. Conversely, we here analyse the corporate level, suggesting
611 that site owners can be both responsible towards territories and increasingly competitive. Second,
612 we provide a unique adoption of the SRBV, which has been, by now, mainly applied to small non
613 for profit firms and social enterprises (Tate and Bals, 2016). Here, the SRBV is deployed to analyse
614 the decommissioning strategy of a for profit firm. Third, this paper provides a real example of SV
615 creation, thus facing one of the core criticalities moved to the paradigm: its vagueness (Crane, et al.,
616 2014) and limited capability of providing guidelines in regulatory voids (de los Reyes, et al. 2017).
617 In conclusion, we acknowledge the limitations of this research and open paths for future ones.
618 This paper grounds on a qualitative analysis, which obviously does not support a systematic
619 generalization of results. Conversely, it stimulates the exploration of the issue in different contexts:
620 we suggest further research in this direction. A second limitation concerns the quantification of the
621 impacts, that have been here evaluated in terms of contribution of the company to SV drivers.
622 Future research could focus on extending the period of observation, to capture the conclusion of the
623 redevelopment phase. Last, this paper focuses on the role of the company and takes on a firm's
624 perspective while studying the interactions with policy makers. Therefore, it does not study how
625 policy makers themselves could influence the proactive efforts of firms in the decommissioning,
626 phase, which could be worth further investigations.

627

628 **References**

- 629 Arkema, 2012. Launch of “Lacq Cluster Chimie 2030”: an exemplary redevelopment of the Lacq
630 Industrial Basin. [https://www.arkema.com/en/media/news/news-details/Launch-of-Lacq-Cluster-
631 Chimie-2030-an-exemplary-redevelopment-of-the-Lacq-industrial-basin/](https://www.arkema.com/en/media/news/news-details/Launch-of-Lacq-Cluster-Chimie-2030-an-exemplary-redevelopment-of-the-Lacq-industrial-basin/) (accessed 20 March
632 2019).
- 633 Barney, J., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. *Journal of Management*.
634 17(1), 99–120. <https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639101700108>.
- 635 Beckmann, M., Hielscher, S., Pies, I., 2014. Commitment Strategies for Sustainability: How
636 Business Firms Can Transform Trade-Offs Into Win–Win Outcomes. *Business Strategy and the
637 Environment*. 23, 18-37. DOI: 10.1002/bse.1758.
- 638 Bowen, H. R., 1953. *Social Responsibilities of the Businessman*, Harper & Row, New York.
- 639 Brookes, N.J., Locatelli, G., 2015. Power plants as megaprojects: Using empirics to shape policy,
640 planning and construction management. *Utilities Policy*. 36, 57-66.
641 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2015.09.005>.
- 642 CABERNET Coordination Team, LQMG Group, 2006, *Sustainable Brownfield Regeneration:*
643 *CABERNET Network Report*, Nottingham: University of Nottingham.

644 Cappuyins, V., 2016. Inclusion of social indicators in decision support tools for the selection of
645 sustainable site remediation options. *Journal of Environmental Management*. 184, 45-56.
646 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2016.07.035>.

647 Carroll, A., 1979. A three dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance, *Academy of*
648 *Management Review*. 4(4), 497-505.

649 Crane, A., Palazzo, G., Spence, L.J., Matten, D., 2014. Contesting the Value of creating Shared
650 Value, *California Management Review*. 56(2), 130-156.

651 de los Reyes, G., Scholz, M.Jr., Smith, C., 2017. Beyond the “Win-Win”: creating Shared Value
652 requires ethical frameworks, *California Management review*. 59(2), 142-167.
653 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0008125617695286>.

654 Dixon, T., 2006. Integrating Sustainability into Brownfield Regeneration: Rhetoric or Reality? An
655 Analysis of the UK Development Industry. *Journal of Property Research*. 23(3), 237-267.
656 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09599910600933889>.

657 Dixon, T., Pocock, Y., Waters, M., 2006. An analysis of the UK development industry's role in
658 brownfield regeneration. *Journal of Property Investment and Finance*. 24(6), 521-541.
659 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14635780610708310>.

660 Dobele, A. R., Westberg, K., Steel, M., Flowers, K., 2014. An examination of Corporate Social
661 Responsibility Implementation and Stakeholder Engagement: a case study in the Australian Mining
662 Industry. 23, 145-159. DOI: 10.1002/bse.1775.

663 Drax Plc, 2018. Drax moves closer to coal-free future with unit four conversion.
664 https://www.drax.com/press_release/drax-moves-closer-coal-free-future-unit-four-conversion/
665 (accessed 20 March 2019).

666 EEA, 2014. Progress in Management of Contaminated Sites (CSI 015/LSI 003).

667 Espinoza, R.D., Morris, J.W.F., 2017. Towards sustainable mining (part II): accounting for mine
668 reclamation and post reclamation care liabilities. *Resource Policy*. 52, 29-38.
669 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.01.010>.

670 European Commission, 2019. Energy sector economic analysis. [https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-](https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/energy-sector-economic-analysis)
671 [topic/energy-sector-economic-analysis](https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/energy-sector-economic-analysis) (accessed in November 2019).

672 Favi, C., Germani, M., Mandolini, M., Marconi, M., 2016. PLANTLCA: A Lifecycle Approach to
673 Map and Characterize Resource Consumptions and Environmental Impacts of Manufacturing Plants.
674 *Procedia CIRP*. 48:146-151. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2016.03.102>.

675 Ferber, U., Nathanail, P., Bergatt, J., Gorski, M., Drobiec, L., Petríková, D., 2006. Brownfields
676 Handbook: Cross-disciplinary educational tool focused on the issue of brownfield regeneration,
677 Lifelong Educational Projects on Brownfield, Leonardo da Vinci.

678 Hou D., Al-Tabbaa A., 2014. Sustainability: a New Imperative in Contaminated Land Remediation.
679 *Environmental Science and Policy*. 39, 25-34. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2014.02.003>.

680 Invernizzi D.C., Locatelli G., Brookes N., 2017. Managing Social Challenges in the Nuclear
681 Decommissioning Industry: a Responsible Approach towards Better Performances. *International*
682 *Journal of Project Management*. 35(7), 1350–1364. DOI: doi.org10.1016/j.ijproman.2016.12.002
683 Doi: 10.1016/j.ijproman.2016.12.002

684 JRC, 2015. Remediated sites and brownfields. Success stories in Europe; EUR 27530 EN; doi
685 102788/406096.

686 Kraaijenbrink, J., Spender, J.C., Groe, A.J., 2010. A Resource Based View: a review and
687 assessment of its critiques, 36 (1), 349-372. DOI: 10.1177/0149206309350775.

688 Litz, R.A., 1996. A Resource-Based-View of the Socially Responsible Firm: Stakeholder
689 Interdependence, Ethical Awareness and Issue Responsiveness as Strategic Assets. Journal of
690 Business Ethics. 15, 1355-1363.

691 Maltz, E., Thompson, F., Ringold, D.J., 2011. Assessing and maximizing corporate social
692 initiatives: strategic view of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Public Affairs. 11(4), 344-
693 352. DOI: 10.1002/pa.384.

694 Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., 1994. Qualitative data analysis: an expanded sourcebook, second
695 ed. Sage Publications Inc: Thousand Oaks, CA.

696 MISE, 2017. National Energy Strategy. [https://www.mise.gov.it/index.php/en/news/2037432-
697 national-energy-strategy](https://www.mise.gov.it/index.php/en/news/2037432-national-energy-strategy) (accessed in November 2019).

698 Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R., Wood, D.J., 1997. Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and
699 Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts. The Academy of Management
700 Review. 22(4), 853-886. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/259247>.

701 Nehring, M., Cheng, X., 2016. An investigation into the impact of mine closures and its associated
702 cost on life of mine planning and resource recovery. Journal of Cleaner Production. 127, 228-239.
703 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.03.162>.

704 Norrman J. et al., 2016. Integration of the subsurface and the surface sectors for a more holistic
705 approach for sustainable redevelopment of urban brownfields, Science of the Total Environment.
706 563-564, 879-889. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2016.02.097>.

707 Novamont, 2019. Il modello Novamont. <https://www.novamont.com/il-modello-novamont>
708 (accessed 20 March 2019).

709 Onkila, T., 2011. Multiple forms of stakeholders interaction in environmental management:
710 business arguments regarding differences in stakeholder relationships. Business Strategy and the
711 Environment. 20, 379-393. DOI: 10.1002/bse.693.

712 Perko, T., Monken-Fernandes, H., Martell, M., Zeleznik, N., O'Sullivan, P. 2017, Societal
713 constraints related to environmental remediation and decommissioning programmes, Journal of
714 environmental radioactivity, in press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvrad.2017.06.014>

715 Peteraf, M.A., Barney, J.B., 2003. Unraveling the resource-based triangle. Managerial and Decision
716 Economics. 24, 309–323. <https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1126>.

717 Porter, M. E., Kramer, M., 2011. Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism and Unleash
718 a Wave of Innovation and Growth. Harvard Business Review. 89 (1-2), 62-77.

719 Schädler S., Morio M., Bartke S., Finkel M., 2012. Integrated Planning and Spatial Evolution of
720 Megasite Remediation and Reuse Options. Journal of Contaminant Hydrology. 127, 88-100.
721 doi:10.1016/j.jconhyd.2011.03.003.

722 Stezar, I.C., Pizzol, L., Critto, A., Ozunu, A., Marcomini, A., 2013. Comparison of risk-based
723 decision support systems for brownfield site rehabilitation: DESYRE and SADA applied to a
724 Romanian case study. Journal of Environmental Management.
725 DOI:10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.09.022.

- 726 Tate, W.L., Bals, L., 2016. Achieving Shared Triple Bottom Line (TBL) Value Creation: Toward a
727 Social Resource-Based View (SRBV) of the Firm. *Journal of Business Ethics*. 1-24.
728 doi: 10.1007/s10551-016-3344-y
- 729 Yin, R., 2014. *Case Study Research*. fifth ed., Sage Publications, Inc: Thousand Oaks, CA.
- 730

731 **APPENDIXES**732 **A.**

733 Details on the 24 sites that the case company is decommissioning in Italy

Site	Dimension [ksqm]	Capacity [MW]	Technology	Region	State
A	66	176	Gas turbine	Piemonte	Towards a new destination of use
B	3800	2640	Thermoelectric with burning oil	Veneto	Solution identified
C	900	690	Thermoelectric combined cycle	Piemonte	Solution identified
D	690,7	1738	Thermoelectric oil and gas	Calabria	Towards a new destination of use
E	2000	3600	Thermoelectric oil and gas	Lazio	Towards a new destination of use
F	16000	n.a.	Mining area	Tuscany	Procedure to be started
G	65	88	Turbogas	Molise	Towards a new destination of use
H	48	295	Thermoelectric, carbon	Liguria	In use, procedure to be activated
I	76	176	Turbogas	E.Romagna	Solution identified
J	118	140	Thermoelectric, carbon	Veneto	Solution identified
K	720	1282	Thermoelectric, combined cycle	Liguria	Procedure to be started
L	130	310	Thermoelectric, burning oil	Tuscany	Towards a new destination of use
M	1400	1240	Thermoelectric, burning oil	Tuscany	Solution identified
N	79	104	Turbogas	Marche	Towards a new destination of use
O	1136	553	Turbogas	Umbria	Procedure to be started
P	140	150	Thermoelectric, carbon	Umbria	Towards a new destination of use
Q	150	250	Turbogas	Molise	Procedure to be started
R	80	206	Thermoelectric oil and gas	Puglia	Towards a new destination of use
S	281,1	1341	Thermoelectric gas	Sicily	Towards a new destination of use
T	150	210	Thermoelectric, burning oil	Sicily	Towards a new destination of use
U	138	320	Thermoelectric, burning oil	Sardinia	Towards a new destination of use
V	57	177	Turbogas	Sardinia	Solution identified
W	82	352	Turbogas	Campania	Towards a new destination of use
X	69	352	Turbogas	Campania	Procedure to be started

734

735

736 **B.**

737 An example of general questions posed to internal informants:

738 **Considering your company:**

- 739 1. How would you define the strategic orientation (growth and renewal, flexibility and stability, value
740 innovation, operating efficiency, new product development...) and goal orientation (growth, stability,
741 flexibility, quality...)?
- 742 2. What key contingencies would you define as useful to shape the context (regulations, technological changes,
743 macroeconomic conjunctures...)?

744 **Considering the strategy (strategies) adopted in site decommissioning:**

- 745 3. What kind of rules, values and habits are mainly affecting it?
- 746 4. Are there also opportunities for the company? What are they?
- 747 5. How would you define the strategy adopted by the company in dealing with obsolete resources (or a precise
748 example)? Is there one holistic strategy or are there dispersed approaches? Who is the responsible?
- 749 6. What are the resources affected by these strategies? Is it possible to indicate their monetary value now?
- 750 7. Which characteristics resources should have to be considered valuable and strategic?
- 751 8. Which capabilities are considered key?
- 752 9. Are impacts considered (before-while shaping the strategy)? How?
- 753 10. Does the strategy imply a high –medium or low risk level? Why?
- 754 11. Who are the main stakeholders? Would you define them as allies, opponents, dangerous or key ones?
- 755 12. How and when are stakeholders engaged?

756

757

Site	Territory and location: characteristics and infrastructure	Territory: economic activities and main sectors	Inhabited areas
A	The plant is located in industrial dedicated zone. It is surrounded mainly by fields for agricultural activities (with a few farms). It is also close to a zone for social structures and hospitals and to public areas and parks (some of them protected)	The province is strategic for industry, commerce, research and cultural heritage. Indeed, it is strategically located in the middle of an area defined by Turin, Milan, Genova and it is historically a juncture of Piedmont between Lombardy and Liguria Regions. In the province there is the 10% of firms of Piedmont and 1% of Italian ones and are active in diverse sectors (agriculture, services, mining, jewellery).	
B	The plant is set on a “island”, which is delimited by the sea and two rivers. The closest municipality is made up by 11 very small fractions: it is 14 kms far from the Porto Tolle Centre. The area is 25 km far from the closest main road and 35 from a harbour. The area is characterised by a high biodiversity and it is close to a natural park.	The plant is located in the area of Po River Delta, that is characterised by natural, agricultural, industrial and research (Ferrara, Rovigo, Padua, Verona) districts. Agriculture, fishing and commercial services (in wood, fashion and food) characterise the economy of the province and municipality.	In 0-30 minutes distance there are 10.058 residents. In 30-60 mins, there are more than 93 k inhabitants
C	The area where the power plant is located is known for its agricultural activity. Concerning infrastructure, both the main provincial road and highway are 18 km far from the site. This helps the connection of the site with bigger centres as Turin, Alessandria, Ivrea, Novara. The area also hosts a natural reserve wood and there are also historic rural buildings.	The territory is characterised by agricultural activities and it is particularly famous for rice production. In the province, there is the 30% of Italian surface for rice production. In the 1st years, also other production districts have grown, centred on mechanics, concrete, fridges and logistics. In the province there is the 3,8% of the firms of Piedmont and they employ around 70k people.	In 0-10 mins distance there are mainly agricultural fields and few inhabitants (around 580). In 10-20 mins one can find areas inhabited by around 29k residents and more than 90k in 20-30 mins.
D	The plant is located between the seashore and the city. It is 9 kms far from the centre of Rossano and 50 km far from the closest highway. The neighbourhood is characterised by sparse agglomerations of urban, industrial settlements and bathhouses. The area is characterised by an important natural and cultural heritage: indeed, there are natural parks and touristic attractions	The area has mainly a touristic (seaside resorts, an archeologic park) and agricultural vocation. Close to the plant there are also high quality industrial sites (i.e. liquorice production, local eno-gastronomic excellences).The strong criticality of the production system is due to the high fragmentation: individual firms are more than the 60% of the total and the density of firms is much lower than the national average (but in line with the regional one).	scarce infrastructure and low density: in 0-10 mins distance there are around 36.000 residents and in 10-20 mins, 48.000. In the area 0-60 mins, there are more than 300.000 residents.
E	The entire area is characterised by agricultural activities and touristic attractions: i.e., the Etruscan natural and archeologic park nearby, naturalistic parks and seaside. The area is not far from the inhabited centre of the municipality (8 km). The area is bounded by the Sea, an important Road and the Railroad.	The territory is characterised by diverse excellences: nature, archaeology (touristic attractions), universities and production. Local products of high quality are produced in the area (oil, wine, cheese...). There are also numerous small medium enterprises linked to the activities of the industrial and harbour area of Civitavecchia and to extraction activities. Overall, in the municipality	In the territory there are no extended urbanized areas, nor strong infrastructure. In a distance of 0-10 mins, there are areas inhabited by around 8.700 people. This number doubles considering the 10-20 mins zone. In the macro-zone 0-60 mins, one can reach around 491.000 inhabitants.

		the agricultural sector is the most developed (74%, in terms on registered enterprises), followed by the commercial one.	
F	Lignite was industrially extracted in galleries (Mines) since the first half of the XIX century. Mining activity was at the base of the industrial development of the entire area. The site is 40 km far from Florence and Arezzo, 50 from Siena. Both the highway and the closer train stations 5 km far from the site. In the site there is an industrial area and some industrial archaeology. Artificial lakes have been created and an activity of re-naturalization of the area have been in place (woods...). Nowadays, different areas belong to various private entities and diverse municipalities.	Historically, the area strongly depended on the mining activities. Occupation strongly decreased in the 50s, with the mechanization of mining activities. Local industrial activities started, with a focus on furniture, food, shoes and clothes. They also drove commercial activities. Agriculture (high quality products) is we developed in the territory. The production sector is very diversified (agri-food, jewellery, fashion...) and well grounded on manufacture. Moreover, there are important technologically advanced sectors, as ICT production, medical devices, biotechnology, pharma... The region is also reach in terms of research and education	The nantional statistic agency maps the area into a local system of 11 municipalities and around 126.000 inhabitants.
G	The power plant is located in a wide agricultural area, not far from the inhabited centre (4 km) and the sea (3 km far). A highway passes 10 km far from the site, through the municipality that hosts the plant, which can be reached through a national road. Railways and harbours are not very far. The closest airports are 100 km far.	Agriculture is the main sector (grapes and wine, cereals, oil and fruit...). Tourism is also important: the municipality is a well known location at the seaside. Concerning the production system, in the province there is around the 70% of firms of the Region. They are mainly operating in the agricultural sector (36% of firms). Also commercial and construction activities have a relevance (respectively, around 22% and 12% of the firms). In the municipality, activities are specialized in: mineral extraction, utilities, construction and accomodation.	Few residents live in the zones close to the plant: 9.600 people inhabit the area which is 0-10 mins far from the plant. In the macroarea 0-60 minutes, there is a population of 580.000 people.

760

761

762

763 **D.**764 **Details on operating hours and years by site**765 **Sources: Silvio di Pasqua, 2015, Partecipare; Dossiers on the sites to be decommissioned**

<i>PHASE</i>	<i>SITE</i>	<i>Operating hours</i>	<i>Operating years</i>
1	A	Period 1: less than 150 hours / year From 2009 to 2013 few hours (136 in 2011 - 36 in 2012)	1979-1993 1994-2003: stop 2004-2009: only NG 2009-2013: decrease 2013: set out of service
2	B	10-15kwh in the 90s (10% of Italian production) Around 5 k hours in 2006 and then decreased up to 0 for all 4 Groups in 2010.	start 1980-1984 inactive in 2009 not available since 2013
2	C	when it started the production, the yield was of 46% (the plant was designed to function around 6000 hours / year).	start 1996-1997 2013 stop 2016: procedure for acquisition
2	D	Production started declining due to the increase of energy process. In 2010, total operating hours (considering all sections) amounted to 2328. They decreased, up to 30 hours / year in 2014.	start 1976 (with 4 thermoelectric steam sections). In 1994-95 4 turbogas units. In 2014, 2 turbogas units started operating in simple cycle and the other two were put out of service. Concerning steam sections: one is available, one is under conservation and two out of service.
2	E	First years: 5% of the Italian demand of electric energy (16GWh / year) decrease to 12.000 GWh/ year 2009: 1.600 GWh 2011: 200 GWh	Start progressive functioning since 1992 High production 1999-2003 decrease between 2004 and 2006 Strong decrease till 2009 In 2009, a fotovoltaic plant of 12 ha (8,5-9Gw/ year) was installed nearby now the plant is out of service
3	F	overall 44 mln tons of lignite extracted. The power plant is still active	cultivation started in 1955 and ended in 1994 power plant installed in 2006 and STILL ACTIVE.
3	G	1984-2000 from 2003-2013: availability for emergency (last production in 2012)	

766