Market behaviour and the to-trade-or-not-to-trade dilemma in ‘Tradable White Certificate’ schemes

This paper provides an empirical analysis of market behaviour under ‘Tradable White Certificate’ (TWC) schemes. It focuses on the entire set of ‘flexibilities’ given to obliged parties to meet a mandatory energy saving target cost-effectively, i.e. eligible measures; eligible end-use sectors; banking provision; market engagement of other eligible parties; and trading as such. We found that market behaviour responds to the unique design and context in which TWC schemes are implemented. Contrary to expectations, limited trading is observed so the ‘to-trade-or-not-to-trade’ dilemma is further analysed. A real TWC market has emerged only in Italy, where obliged parties (i.e. energy distributors) show preference towards ‘to-trade’. In Great Britain and France an autarky compliance approach is identified, with obliged parties (i.e. energy suppliers) showing preference towards ‘not-to-trade’ driven by, among many factors, commercial co-benefits of non-trading (e.g. increased competitiveness). At the same time, results show clearer indications of cost-effectiveness for Great Britain than for Italy. In general, high energy-saving effectiveness is observed, but low ambitious saving targets and pitfalls in the regulatory framework need to be considered to further develop TWC markets. Initial market and institutional conditions strongly suggest that trading might not be an immediate outcome. Ambitious but reachable targets can trigger a more dynamic usage of all flexibilities by eligible parties and thus active behaviour in TWC markets.